Category Archives: Sunnis

Uncle Sam and the Saudi Crescent

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bush-abdullahBy Diana West:

“World Must Unite Against US-Saudi-Israeli Proxy War in Syria” is the headline over a piece at Infowars by Tony Cartalucci, a reporter whose work on Uncle Sam’s entanglement in jihad I’ve read with interest before. The piece makes a moral argument against the war on Assad that I find rather less transfixing than the ghastly spectacle of what he further describes as the US-UK-Saudi-Qatari alliance fighting this war. Call me ethno-centric, but I keep going back to the basic question: What is Uncle Sam doing running around with sharia allies remaking the Middle East into sharia-terror states?

Cartalucci connects some important dots — literally — by lining up data amassed in 2007 to indicate the Syrian centers from which Al Qaeda fighters entered Iraq with today’s “rebel” centers, where the CIA is providing weapons and other assistance. His caption beneath a graphic illustration sums up:

West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center’s 2007 report, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq” indicated which areas in Syria Al Qaeda fighters filtering into Iraq came from. The overwhelming majority of them came from Dayr Al-Zawr in Syria’s southeast, Idlib in the north near the Turkish-Syrian border, and Dar’a in the south near the Jordanian-Syrian border. (Right) A map indicating the epicenters of violence in Syria indicate that the exact same hotbeds for Al Qaeda in 2007, now serve as the epicenters of so-called “pro-democracy fighters” and also happen to be areas the US CIA is admittedly distributing weapons and other aid in.

The morality of taking Assad down aside, what is Uncle Sam doing supporting jihad again? We watched this treacherous pattern take shape in Libya where, to my mind, the moral argument against the West’s war on Qaddafi is stronger given that the West betrayed Qaddafi. The West brought down an enemy-turned-ally by switching sides to provide crucial support to the jihad forces that would triumph. And while we’re on the subject of morality, it seems amiss to omit the colossal moral argument to be made against the world war waged by innumerable proxies to destroy Israel. Speaking of Israel, its headliner role in the Syria perfidy doesn’t quite materialize in Cartalucci’s piece, which may be due to the case I’ve picked up along the way that the Israelis would prefer, as a military matter, to see Assad remain in power rather than a Muslim-Brotherhood-Al-Qaeda-jihad revolution. But at this point of world craziness who knows?

Cartalucci’s main point of interest, however, is that the current US policy to arm al Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood jihadists to overthrow Assad goes back to 2007. We must go back to the Bush administration to pick up the policy trail.

He writes:

While the West has attempted to reclaim Syria as part of its sphere of influence for decades, concrete plans for the latest proxy war were laid at least as early as 2007. It was admitted in 2007 that the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel conspired together to fund, arm, and direct sectarian extremists including militants “sympathetic” to Al Qaeda, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, against the governments of Iran and Syria. In Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh’s 2007 New Yorker article,  “The Redirection: Is the Administration’s new policy benefiting our enemies in the war on terrorism?” the conspiracy was described as follows:

To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.

Hersh also cited US, Saudi, and Lebanese officials who indicated that, “in the past year, the Saudis, the Israelis, and the Bush Administration have developed a series of informal understandings about their new strategic direction,” and that, “the Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, would provide funds and logistical aid to weaken the government of President Bashir Assad, of Syria. The report would also state:

Some of the core tactics of the redirection are not public, however. The clandestine operations have been kept secret, in some cases, by leaving the execution or the funding to the Saudis, or by finding other ways to work around the normal congressional appropriations process, current and former officials close to the Administration said.

Mention of the Muslim Brotherhood already receiving aid even in 2007 was also made:

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a branch of a radical Sunni movement founded in Egypt in 1928, engaged in more than a decade of violent opposition to the regime of Hafez Assad, Bashir’s father. In 1982, the Brotherhood took control of the city of Hama; Assad bombarded the city for a week, killing between six thousand and twenty thousand people. Membership in the Brotherhood is punishable by death in Syria. The Brotherhood is also an avowed enemy of the U.S. and of Israel. Nevertheless, Jumblatt said, “We told Cheney that the basic link between Iran and Lebanon is Syria—and to weaken Iran you need to open the door to effective Syrian opposition.”

There is evidence that the Administration’s redirection strategy has already benefitted the Brotherhood. The Syrian National Salvation Front is a coalition of opposition groups whose principal members are a faction led by Abdul Halim Khaddam, a former Syrian Vice-President who defected in 2005, and the Brotherhood. A former high-ranking C.I.A. officer told me, “The Americans have provided both political and financial support. The Saudis are taking the lead with financial support, but there is American involvement.” He said that Khaddam, who now lives in Paris, was getting money from Saudi Arabia, with the knowledge of the White House. (In 2005, a delegation of the Front’s members met with officials from the National Security Council, according to press reports.) A former White House official told me that the Saudis had provided members of the Front with travel documents.

Cartalucci sums up:

The Wall Street Journal in 2007 would also implicate the Muslim Brotherhood and more specifically, the so-called “National Salvation Front,” in its article, “To Check Syria, U.S. Explores Bond With Muslim Brothers.”

It is clear that the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel planned to use sectarian extremists against the nation of Syria starting at least as early as 2007, and it is clear that now these sectarian extremists are carrying out the destruction of Syria with a massive torrent of weapons and cash provided by the US and its regional allies, just as was described by Hersh’s report.

Recalling long ago Bush administration burblings about a “Sunni crescent” in the Middle East, I retrieved the following article from the London Telegraph dated December 14, 2006. This, more or less, may mark the debut, or, at least, a debut of the pro-Sunni policy that continues to undergird Middle East policy — disastrous for the US, but, whaddya know, a boon for Saudi Arabia. (Links from the original.)

The Telegraph reported:

Saudi Arabia would respond to an American withdrawal from Iraq by funding and arming Sunni insurgents to prevent them being massacred by Shia militias, the kingdom has told the White House.

The blunt warning, which diplomatic sources said was delivered by King Abdullah to Vice President Dick Cheney in Riyadh just over a fortnight ago, raises the spectre of an Iraqi civil war triggering a conflict between Sunni and Shia states across the Middle East.

Funny how King Abdullah was always delivering blunt warnings to the Bush administration — and funny how they were always taken to heart.

Read more at Diana West’s blog

Has Obama Gone Soft on Hamas?

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obama-hamas-1024x769Front Page- By :

Before Obama’s trip to Israel, he met with two organizations that support Hamas. And one of those organizations provided him with pro-Hamas proposals.

During his trip, his language suggested that his administration was softening its line on Hamas, calling on it not to engage in violence, rather than condemning it.

Elder points out the difference between the way that Obama talked about Hamas and Hezbollah. When referring to Hamas, Obama said;

“That’s why we have made it clear, time and again, that Israel cannot accept rocket attacks from Gaza, and have stood up for Israel’s right to defend itself. And that’s why Israel has a right to expect Hamas to renounce violence and recognize Israel’s right to exist.”

Obama Inc. actually pressured Israel into calling off a ground assault, but let’s skip over the fact check. While Obama does say that Israel has the right to defend itself, he does not condemn Hamas.

Instead he makes a ‘peace process’ like statement that Israel has the right to expect Hamas to renounce violence. (This is not quite the same thing as Obama saying that he demands that Hamas do this.) The statement is meaningless except as a prelude to negotiations. Rather than rejecting Hamas’ existence, Obama is proposing terms on which Israel should negotiate with Hamas.

On the other hand when it comes to Hezbollah, Obama offered a strong condemnation;

I think about five Israelis who boarded a bus in Bulgaria, who were blown up because of where they came from; who were robbed of the ability to live, and love, and raise families. That’s why every country that values justice should call Hezbollah what it truly is – a terrorist organization. Because the world cannot tolerate an organization that murders innocent civilians, stockpiles rockets to shoot at cities, and supports the massacre of men, women and children in Syria.

Apparently the world can tolerate Hamas… but not Hezbollah.

What’s the difference? Focus on the last 10 words. Hamas is part of the Sunni coalition and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s on the “right side” of the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah is part of the Shiite coalition. It’s on the “wrong side” of the Syrian Civil War.

And this isn’t a one off. Here is how Obama discussed Hamas in his Ramallah press conference with Abbas.

I would point out that all this stands in stark contrast to the misery and repression that so many Palestinians continue to confront in Gaza — because Hamas refuses to renounce violence; because Hamas cares more about enforcing its own rigid dogmas than allowing Palestinians to live freely; and because too often it focuses on tearing Israel down rather than building Palestine up.  We saw the continuing threat from Gaza again overnight, with the rockets that targeted Sderot.  We condemn this violation of the important cease-fire that protects both Israelis and Palestinians — a violation that Hamas has a responsibility to prevent.

This is being described as a condemnation, but really it’s Obama treating Hamas like a legitimate government that he expects to behave according to American standards.

It’s long way from treating Hamas like a terrorist group. This actually represents the growing legitimization of Hamas.

 

Fall of Assad May Herald Dangerous Iran-Brotherhood Pact

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad talks to Egypt's President Mohamed Mursi (R) after his speech during the 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran, August 30, 2012. (Photo: Reuters)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad talks to Egypt’s President Mohamed Mursi (R) after his speech during the 16th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran, August 30, 2012. (Photo: Reuters)

By Ryan Mauro

A shift is taking place in the Middle East that may culminate in a powerful Iranian-Muslim Brotherhood alliance. The two are killing each other in Syria right now, but an emerging split in the Sunni bloc offers an opportunity for them to make amends once the fight is over.

The Sunni bloc has devolved into two factions, separated by their relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt is now governed by the Brotherhood and has passed a Constitution that institutes Sharia (Islamic) Law. Qatar lavishly blesses the Brotherhood, though it is led by a monarchy that the U.S. considers an important ally.

Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi writes, “Qatar is today the Muslim Brotherhood’s banker and personal financier, bankrolling its budget and investing heavily in the group’s project.” It is home to Al-Jazeera, the anti-American “news” network where Brotherhood spiritual leader Yousef al-Qaradawi has his own weekly show. Qatar has come to the economic rescue of Brotherhood-run Egypt and supported the Libyan Islamists’ bid for power. The Qatari Royal Family is supporting the Brotherhood but, like the Saudis, is bound to regret it one day.

The other faction is led by pro-U.S. Sunni governments that oppose both Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. The loudest member of this faction is the United Arab Emirates, which is arresting suspected Brotherhood operatives and publicly called for an anti-Iran/Brotherhood alliance in October. The police chief of Dubai is especially forceful in his language, warning that the Brotherhood has a plan to try to wrest control from the Gulf monarchies by 2016.

The Jordanian government is in the anti-Brotherhood bloc as well. King Abdullah II is trying to outmaneuver the Jordanian Brotherhood by embracing its more secular-oriented opponents. Jordan just held elections and there was high turnout even though the Brotherhood endorsed a boycott. The Brotherhood is trying to capitalize on Jordan’s economic troubles, prompting the United Arab Emirates to urge the Gulf Cooperation Council to provide financial aid. Interestingly, the Emirates haven’t delivered on its pledge of $3 billion in aid for Egypt.

The Saudi Royal Family is just as concerned about the Brotherhood but is less vocal about it. The Saudi government still supports the Islamist ideology, but fears its manifestation in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. In February 2011, the Saudi government ordered libraries to get rid of books by Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and the Brotherhood cleric that inspired Al-Qaeda named Sayyid Qutb.

The split within the Sunni bloc is reflected in Syria. The Sunni bloc agrees with supporting the rebels in general, but the Saudis and Qataris are supporting rival elements within the Syrian opposition. Qatar is backing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, while a rebel military official says the Saudis “don’t want any ties to anything called Muslim Brothers.”

Read more at Radical Islam

Behind the Lines: A Gulf apart

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By JONATHAN SPYER

Gulf monarchies are sharply divided on how to respond to the Muslim Brotherhood threat. While Saudi Arabia, UAE see the Brotherhood as a danger to stability, longevity of the monarchies, Qatar embraces it as an ally.

Egypt's Morsi meets with Qatari PM al-Thani Photo REUTERS

Saudi and United Arab Emirates security forces recently apprehended a 10-man  cell linked to the Muslim Brotherhood that was active in the UAE. The cell,  according to Gulf media reports, was engaged in raising money for the Muslim  Brotherhood in Egypt, propagandizing among Egyptians residing in the UAE and  gathering information on the UAE’s defense facilities. It was also reported as  being in “constant communication” with its parent movement in Cairo.

The  arrest of this group has highlighted growing fears in some conservative Gulf  states that the Muslim Brotherhood is now turning its attention to the Gulf  monarchies.

But the monarchies are sharply divided in their response to  the rise of the Brotherhood.

The 2011 to 2012 period brought a  long-awaited windfall of political power for the Muslim Brothers. Franchises of  the movement are now in government power in Tunisia and Egypt. The Brotherhood  is playing a major role in the Western- supported political and military  leaderships of the rebellion in Syria.

The Palestinian branch of the  movement – Hamas – would almost certainly have consumed its Fatah rivals by now  were the latter not protected by Israel and supported by the  West.

Indeed, the real story of the Arab upheavals of the last two years  can be summed up as the replacement of secular nationalist dictatorships by  Sunni Islamist movements, among which Muslim Brotherhood franchises form the  most important element.

The secular nationalist space in the Arab world  has now largely been replaced by an area of Sunni Islamist  domination.

Only one secular nationalist regime – Algeria – remains in  secure existence. The oil-rich monarchies form the next natural  target.

In the Gulf, however, the situation is not simple. Sunni  Islamists and Gulf monarchs are not necessarily natural enemies.

The Gulf  monarchs adhere to and rule in the name of conservative, Sunni forms of  Islam.

The Muslim Brothers may be revolutionaries, but they are also  conservatives, seeking to revive what they present as an authentic form of  Islamic government. In the past, Brotherhood exiles from Egypt and the Fertile  Crescent played a vital role in developing the education systems and manning the  bureaucracies of Gulf states.

This has led to two widely variant Gulf  approaches to the movement.

The first, exemplified by Saudi Arabia and  the UAE, sees the Brotherhood as the most dangerous challenge to the stability  and longevity of the monarchies. The UAE and Saudi Arabia fear the Brotherhood  precisely because its beliefs render it potentially appealing to dissatisfied  elements among the populations of these states.

Last July, Dubai police  chief Dhahi Kalfan (a name familiar to Israelis because of his central role in  the events following the killing of Hamas official Mahmoud Mabhuh in the  emirate), accused the Brotherhood of plotting the overthrow of the Gulf  monarchies.

The latest arrests follow the apprehending of 60 suspected  members of the Brotherhood- linked al-Islah (“Reform and Social Guidance”) movement over the summer in the UAE.

UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah  bin Zayed al-Nahayan said after the arrests that “The Muslim Brotherhood does  not believe in the sovereignty of the state.”

Saudi Arabian Interior  Minister Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, meanwhile, has called the Brotherhood “the  source of all the problems in the Islamic world.” The Saudis, seeking a  counterweight to the Brotherhood in both Egypt and Syria, have thrown their  weight (and financial support) behind ultra-conservative Salafi Islamist  forces.

By contrast, the second approach, of which Qatar is the main  exponent, sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a suitable ally, client and instrument.  Qatar has adopted this strategy with energy and alacrity, as may be observed  from its growing ties with the Brotherhood government in Egypt, support for the  Brotherhood in Libya and Yemen and close links with the Sunni insurgency in  Syria.

Qatar has long provided sanctuary for Muslim Brotherhood members.  In return, the movement has since 1999 refrained from activity within the  emirate. Famously, Doha offered a base of activities for the  Brotherhood-associated Sheikh Yusuf al- Qaradawi, whose enormously influential  broadcasts were put out by the emirate’s satellite channel, Al  Jazeera.

Key current and former staffers at the highly influential Al  Jazeera (which, of course, never criticizes Qatar) are Muslim Brotherhood  members. Among these are Waddah Khanfar, former general manager of Al  Jazeera.

Read more at The Jerusalem Post

Who’s Who in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

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By Eric Trager, Katie Kiraly, Cooper Klose, and Eliot Calhoun

Given its growing control over key government institutions and its unmatched mobilizing capabilities, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely remain Egypt’s most consequential political actor for many years to come. But who are the men who make up this uniquely cohesive and secretive “society,” and what impact will they have on the country’s domestic and foreign policy?

 

Introduction

Since Hosni Mubarak’s February 2011 ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as Egypt’s most potent political force. It won a decisive plurality in the winter 2011–2012 People’s Assembly elections and a majority in the January 2012 Shura Council elections, thus gaining control over both houses of parliament and the committee that is writing the next constitution. And in June, the group successfully campaigned to elect Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi as Egypt’s first civilian president.

Since taking office, Morsi has moved quickly to consolidate the organization’s power, appointing fellow Muslim Brothers to head key ministries and cracking down on media criticism of the group. His boldest moves came on August 12, when he sacked the generals who posed the greatest threat to his authority, promoted new generals who now answer to him, and issued a constitutional declaration that gave him full executive, legislative, and constitution-writing powers. Although Morsi and the Brotherhood may yet face challenges from non-Islamists, Salafists, former regime elements, and, perhaps, the judiciary, the group’s unmatched mobilizing capabilities and control over key government institutions will likely make it Egypt’s most consequential political actor for many years to come.

For this reason, it is worth taking a closer look at the individuals who make up the Brotherhood’s organizational and political leadership. After all, the group views itself not as a political party directed by a single chairman, but as a cohesive “society” that operates on the basis of internal consultation, or shura. Accordingly, its strategic and policy decisions will be guided not only by Morsi and Supreme Guide Muhammad Badie, but also by a team of longtime Brotherhood officials who will coordinate efforts across the various political bodies the group now dominates.
Who are these individuals? While the profiles in this compendium demonstrate that Brotherhood leaders come from many different educational and professional backgrounds, their stories illustrate three important points about the organization.

First, the Brotherhood’s leadership is composed almost exclusively of longtime members. Most were recruited during high school or college and, in many cases, served in top administrative positions within the Brotherhood’s nationwide structure before being promoted to the Guidance Office (the organization’s top executive authority) or nominated for political office. To some extent, this is typical of any political organization: veteran members tend to lead. But for the Brotherhood, having longtime members in top posts ensures that its leaders have all been vetted over the course of decades for their willingness to comply with the internal shura committee’s decisions. This does not mean that internal divisions are impossible, but the tight, time-tested circle in which decisions are made makes this highly unlikely. As a result, the Brotherhood maintains a unity of purpose that other Egyptian political groups have yet to achieve.

Second, in addition to their positions within the group, most Brotherhood leaders were active in important societal organizations under the Mubarak regime, serving on the boards of professional syndicates, heading labor unions, running religious charities, and/or participating in key social clubs. These positions enabled them to build their stature at a time when avenues for more direct political participation were often blocked. Such activity also helped the group expand its outreach networks, through which it gained popular support by providing social services and increasing its recruitment efforts.

Third, almost all of the Brotherhood’s top leaders were directly persecuted under the Mubarak regime, and many served time as political prisoners. To some extent, this enhances their unity, particularly among those who were imprisoned together. More important, it makes them unlikely to tolerate competing centers of power, since the Brotherhood’s ouster could invite a new era of repression against the organization.

Individual profiles suggest other important points about the Brotherhood as well. In particular, the group’s recruitment networks clearly have international reach, since three of its top leaders (including Morsi) came aboard while living in the United States. The Brotherhood’s internal promotion structure is also somewhat nepotistic, given that its top leaders frequently are related to each other through marriage or are professional colleagues. Finally, despite the fact that Brotherhood officials have never run a government ministry or wielded meaningful political power until recently, the group is confident that it has the expertise to lead Egypt because its members come from many different professional backgrounds.

This first installment of Brotherhood profiles examines top figures from the Guidance Office, the Freedom and Justice Party (the group’s political arm), the parliamentary leadership, and members of Morsi’s presidential office. These profiles will be updated as new information surfaces, and new ones will be added over time.

(Note: To see quotation sources and photographs for each individual profiled, download the PDF version of the compendium.)

Index:

  • Saber Abouel Fotouh
  • Salah Abdel Maqsoud
  • Saber Abdul Sadeq
  • Sabri Amer
  • Sheikh Sayyed Askar
  • Khaled al-Azhari
  • Muhammad Badie
  • Muhammad al-Beltagy
  • Amr Darrag
  • Essam al-Erian
  • Mahmoud Ezzat
  • Ahmed Fahmi
  • Ali Fath al-Bab
  • Mahmoud Ghozlan
  • Essam al-Haddad
  • Mahmoud Hussein
  • Saad al-Husseini
  • Hussein Ibrahim
  • Farid Ismail
  • Saad al-Katatni
  • Mahmoud el-Khodary
  • Hassan Malek
  • Muhammad Morsi
  • Mustafa Mosaad
  • Gen. Abbas Mukhaymer
  • Al-Sayyed Negidah
  • Subhi Saleh
  • Akram al-Shaer
  • Khairat al-Shater
  • Ahmed Suleiman
  • Muhammad Tousoun
  • Tareq Wafiq
  • Osama Yassin

Top Leaders

Muhammad Morsi

محمد مرسي

  • Born: August 1951
  • Position: President of Egypt; formerly member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, parliamentarian (2000–2005), and chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party
  • Education: Doctorate in engineering from University of Southern California (1982), master’s degree in engineering from Cairo University (1978), bachelor’s degree in engineering from Cairo University (1975)
  • Occupation: Engineer

Morsi was first recruited to the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States while studying for his PhD in engineering at the University of Southern California. His children were born in California and are U.S. citizens. After receiving his doctorate in 1982, he taught as an assistant professor at California State University–Northridge until 1985.

He then returned to Egypt to teach at Zagazig University, where his colleagues included current Brotherhood deputy supreme guides Mahmoud Ezzat and Mahmoud Ghozlan. Some sources report that Morsi’s rise in the MB began in 2000, when he was elected as a member of the People’s Assembly and served as the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc leader from 2000 to 2005. After losing his parliamentary race in 2005 due to Mubarak regime forgery, he became leader of the Brotherhood’s political division. From 2007 onward, he was also the key point of contact between the MB and the regime’s repressive State Security apparatus (and, according to MB political leader Saad al-Husseini, between the Brotherhood and Hamas).

Morsi has been arrested at least twice: he was detained for seven months in 2006 after protesting alongside several judges who had been targeted by the regime, and again during the January 2011 uprising, along with several other Brotherhood leaders. Following the uprising, the MB leadership appointed him chairman of the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party. In April 2012, he was chosen as the group’s backup presidential candidate in the event that its initial candidate, Khairat al-Shater, was barred from running. When Shater was indeed excluded due to a previous conviction, Morsi became the MB’s presidential nominee. In the first round of Egypt’s presidential election, Morsi won 24.78 percent of the vote, securing his position in a runoff against Ahmed Shafiq in mid-June. On June 24, Morsi was declared president, having won 51.73 percent of the vote.

Read the rest at The Washington Institute

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Morsi’s Totalitarian Mandate Is Sharia

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By Andrew G. Bostom

Theodore Roosevelt penned these remarkably prescient words in a 1911 letter to his longtime correspondent and friend, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, reflecting upon Roosevelt’s post-presidency visit to Cairo, Egypt, the previous year.

 

The real strength of the Nationalist movement in Egypt … lay not with these Levantines of the café but with the mass of practically unchanged bigoted Moslems to whom the movement meant driving out the foreigner, plundering and slaying the local Christian, and a return to all the violence and corruption which festered under the old-style Moslem rule, whether Asiatic or African.

 

Roosevelt’s concerns about the recrudescence of “old-style Moslem rule” — that is, a totalitarian sharia (Islamic law) not reshaped or constrained by Western law, may now be fully realized a century later.

 

Less than two years after the forced abdication of Egyptian President Mubarak, we appear to be witnessing the ultimate triumph of the electoral ascendancy of vox populi, mainstream Egyptian Islamic parties — and most prominently, the Muslim Brotherhood.  Muhammad Morsi, the Brotherhood’s freely elected presidential candidate, has successfully outmaneuvered a minority coalition of secular-leaning Muslims, and Christians, to orchestrate the passage of a more robustly sharia-complaint Egyptian constitution.

 

Given President Obama’s repeated admonitions (as reported here and here) that Mubarak relinquish power, immediately, during early February 2011, this prior Tuesday, May 19, 2009 confidential assessment of Mubarak by then-U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey raises profound questions about U.S. actions which facilitated his removal, and the subsequent triumph of Egypt’s sharia supremacists.

 

Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. The Muslim Brothers represent the worst [emphasis added], as they challenge not only Mubarak’s power, but his view of Egyptian interests. As with regional issues, Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak’s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole. He has been supportive of improvements in human rights in areas that do not affect public security or stability. Mrs. Mubarak has been given a great deal of room to maneuver to advance women’s and children’s rights and to confront some traditional practices that have been championed by the Islamists, such as FGM [i.e., female genital mutilation, sanctioned by not merely "Islamists," but the predominant Shafiite school of Islamic law in Egypt, leading to rates of this misogynistc barbarity among Egyptian women of 95%], child labor, and restrictive personal status laws.

 

The Hard-Won Local Triumph, and Global Aspirations of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)

 

February 18, 2011 marked the triumphal return to Cairo of Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) “Spiritual Guide” Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  Qaradawi’s own words, accompanied by images and actions during this appearance, reaffirmed his obscurantist, albeit mainstream Islamic Weltanschauung of sharia-based, aggressive jihadism, and its corollary — virulent Jew- and other infidel-hatred, which should have shattered the delusive view that the turmoil leading to President Mubarak’s resignation augured the emergence of a modern, democratic Egyptian society devoted to Western conceptions of individual liberty and equality before the law.

 

Qaradawi’s Tahrir Square appearance foreshadowed events that have transpired, predictably, from the subsequent nearly two years ’til now, punctuated by the open ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and party affiliates within Egypt and across North Africa and the entire Middle East.  Indeed, Qaradawi’s February 18, 2011 “khutbah,” or sermon, to the adoring Muslim throngs that day reflected the longstanding aspirations of “martyred” Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna and was symbolic of an Islamic revival begun earlier by the so-called “Al-Manar modernists” — Jamal Al-Din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida — more than a century before Qaradawi took the stage at Tahrir Square.

 

Charles Wendell introduced his elegant 1978 translation of five Al-Banna treatises with a particularly astute summary assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood founder’s Weltanschauung.  Wendell stressed Al-Banna’s seamless connection not only to the Al-Manar modernists, but to traditional Islam itself.  Moreover, Wendell’s concluding observations remain critical to understanding the deep Islamic religious animus towards Israel and the West — so much in evidence today — that Al-Banna and his movement both inspired and reflected.

 

Hasan al-Banna’s fundamental conviction that Islam does not accept, or even tolerate, a separation of “church” and state, or of either from society, is as thoroughly Islamic as it can be. Any attempt to translate his movement into terms reducible to social, political, or religious factors exclusively simply misses the boat. The “totality” created by the Prophet Muhammad in the Medinese state, the first Islamic state, was Hasan’s unwavering ideal, and the ideal of all Muslim thinkers before him, including the idle dreamers in the mosque. His ideology then, before it was Egyptian or Arab or whatever, was Islamic to the core. Since it embraced all aspects of human life and thought, it was at least as much religious as anything else. [Emphasis added.] Practically all of his arguments are shored up by frequent quotations from the Qur’an and the Traditions, quite in the style of his medieval forbears. If one considers the public to whom his writings were  addressed, it becomes instantly apparent that such arguments must still be the most compelling for the vast bulk of the Muslim populations of today. The nagging feeling that Islam must, and very quickly at that, catch up with the West, had even by his time filtered down from above to the masses after having been the watchword of the modernizing intellectual for almost a century. There was also the notion that all these Western sciences and techniques were originally adopted from Islamic culture, and were therefore merely “coming home” — a piece of self-conscious back-patting that was already a cliché of most Muslim political writing[.] … To this [Islamic] revivalist mentality, nothing could be more hateful than further diminution of the lands traditionally dominated by Islam. I believe that much of the fury and unconcealed hatred of the Zionist state which is expressed by the majority of Arabs will become more comprehensible in light of what the Islamic domain as a concept really means to the Muslims, seen through the lens of Hasan’s exposition[.] … [T]he Muslim Brotherhood … had, on the basis of indisputable historical facts and clear religious traditions, a ready-made program for a world crusade that required only actors and a leader. Islam had from the beginning been a proselytizing faith. The error of the Islamic peoples, as Al-Afghani had pointed out forty years before, had been to cease their inexorable forward march, to abnegate their God-ordained destiny[.]

 

Nadav Safran’s 1961 study of modern Egyptian political evolution through 1952 confirmed that already by the late 1930s, Egypt’s inchoate experimentation with a Western cultural orientation and constitutional polity had failed miserably, and the authentic Islamic ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood’s  al-Banna were prevailing.  He provided this summary of the predominant attitudes by then, which:

 

… reawakened hostility against Britain for violating Egypt’s national rights, and deep resentment for its support of the foundation of Israel. … The Muslim orientation had become predominant, and the opposition to the Western culture on the ideological level had become nearly total, even though in practice imitation of the surface aspects of that culture remained[.]

 

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s popular appeal and resultant political ascendancy were clearly evident at the close of the 1940s. As noted by Richard P. Mitchell, pre-eminent historian of the movement’s late 1920s advent and first quarter century of activities:

 

… by 1948-49, this movement had reached such massive political proportions  as to undermine the claim of the rulers to speak for the Egyptian people. The government’s decision to crush the movement in 1949 was presumably taken because of the organization’s potential threat to the existing political order.

 

Olivier Carré’s 1983 analysis of the profound regional impact of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since the 1950s described what he termed, aptly, “a striking phenomenon,” which pervaded Egypt, and the Arab Muslim Near East:

 

[W]hen one discusses Islam, as one often does in terms of a social and polit­ical ideal, whether out of religious conviction or because it is in the news, a common language, a sort of conceptual koine [a lingua franca, or widely used language] is found in all Eastern Arab countries — in Muslim schoolbooks, in the speech or behavior of people, whether friends or casual acquaintances, or in press reports on various current events. This common language is derived, ultimately, from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of the Nasserist period and also from what I shall call the “new Muslim Brothers” of the 1970s and 1980s

 

Carré concluded with this foreboding observation, borne out dramatically, at present, by the unfolding events of the so-called Arab Spring, most notably in Egypt:

 

[W]e shall eventually come to speak of a Saudi-inspired and directed neo-Ottomanist utopia, socially based on the middle classes of the Arab East, which is not particularly “new” except by virtue of an acculturation drive. Its militant basis will be Islamic politico-religious groupings of which the new Muslim Brothers is the most significant group.

 

Resilient tenacity and wide, ongoing appeal to Egypt’s Muslim masses enabled the Brotherhood to survive brutal crackdowns under Egyptian autocrats Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.  Spring Fever, Andrew McCarthy’s invaluable recent primer, chronicles how the Brotherhood’s current savvy, battle-hardened leadership rapidly capitalized on the Arab Spring “democracy” fervor to finally assume governmental power with the imprimatur of parliamentary and then presidential electoral victories.

Read more at American Thinker

The World View of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood

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20110630_GMBDRMediumby Joseph S. Spoerl

Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as a force to be reckoned with, not only in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, where it has won elections and assumed power, but also in Europe and North America, where it has been very successful at forming national Islamic organizations claiming to represent Muslims in non-Muslim countries.1 It is more important than ever to understand this group and its ideology. A natural starting point in this effort is to examine the writings of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Sunni Muslim Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949).2 Al-Banna’s worldview may be summarized in four main propositions: First, Islam is a perfect and complete way of life; second, Islam must be the basis of all legislation; third, Western societies are decadent and corrupt; and fourth, God has commanded Muslims to conquer and rule the earth. Each of these propositions is deeply rooted in the worldview of classical Sunni Islam.

  1. Islam is a perfect and complete way of life.

Al-Banna stresses that “Islam is a perfect system of social organization, which encompasses all the affairs of life.”3 Speaking on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts, “We believe that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life.”4 Because Islam is all-encompassing, it is impossible for Muslims to separate politics and religion. Al-Banna advises his fellow Muslim Brothers: “If someone should ask you: To what end is your appeal made? Say: we are calling you to Islam…: government is part of it…. If someone should say to you: This is politics!, say: This is Islam, and we do not recognize such divisions.”5

  1. Islam must be the basis of all legislation.

Because Islam is a complete way of life, encompassing law and politics, all constitutional and positive law must be based on it:

Every nation has a body of law to which its sons have recourse in their legal affairs. This body of law must be derived from the prescriptions of the Islamic Sacred Law, drawn from the Noble Qur’an, and in accordance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence. For the Islamic Sacred Law and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are all-sufficient, supply every need, and cover every contingency, and they produce the most excellent results and the most blessed fruits. If the punishments prescribed by God[note omitted] were carried out, they would be a deterrent dismaying even the hardened criminal…6

It is striking that al-Banna mentions “the punishments prescribed by God” as an example of positive laws that must be derived from Islamic law. These are the so-called hadd punishments (plural hudud), specific punishments like stoning, crucifixion, amputations, or lashes for specific crimes like illicit intercourse, drinking of alcohol, theft, or highway robbery. Under Islamic law, these punishments have a special status because they are directly prescribed by God, either in the Koran or in the teachings of Muhammad.7

As the above quotation makes clear, al-Banna is very scrupulous in adhering to the traditional prescriptions of classical Islamic law. In 1936, al-Banna wrote a letter to King Faruq of Egypt, as well as to the other rulers of Islamic countries, in which he laid out in some detail his program for Islamic government.8 In this letter al-Banna called for

  • “a reform of the law, so that it will conform to Islamic legislation in every branch;”
  • “The diffusion of the Islamic spirit throughout all departments of government, so that all its employees will feel responsible for adhering to Islamic teachings;”
  • “The surveillance of the personal conduct of all [government] employees, and an end to the dichotomy between the private and professional spheres;”
  • Action by Islamic countries to pave the way for the restoration of the Caliphate;9
  • “the imposition of severe penalties for moral offenses” and the prohibition of prostitution, gambling, drinking of alcohol, dancing; and the criminalization of “fornication, whatever the circumstances, as a detestable crime whose perpetrator must be flogged;”
  • “Treatment of the problem of women…in accordance with Islamic teaching” and “segregation of male and female students; “private meetings between men and women,” except for family members, are “to be counted as a crime…”10
  • “The surveillance of theatres and cinemas, and a rigorous selection of plays and films;”
  • “The regulation of business hours for cafes; surveillance of the activities of their regular clients; instructing these as to what is in their best interests…;”
  • “The expurgation of songs, and a rigorous selection and censorship of them;”
  • “The confiscation of provocative stories and books that implant the seeds of skepticism in an insidious manner, and newspapers which strive to disseminate immorality…;”
  • “[P]unishment of all who are proved to have infringed any Islamic doctrine or attacked it, such as breaking the fast of Ramadan, willful neglect of prayers, insulting the faith, or any such act.”
  • “The annexation of the elementary village schools to the mosques…;”
  • “Active instigation to memorize the Qur’an in all the free elementary schools;”
  • “The prohibition of usury, and the organization of banks with this end in view.”

Al-Banna’s program is perhaps more readily understood in the context of a central provision of classical Islamic law, the duty to command the right and forbid the wrong.11 Firmly rooted in the Koran (e.g. 3:104), classical sharia prescribes this as a communal obligation12 of the Islamic umma, and indeed as “the most important fundamental of the religion,” such that “if it were folded up and put away, religion itself would vanish, dissolution appear, and whole lands come to ruin.”13 Gudrun Krämer writes that this Koranic injunction to command the right and prohibit the wrong “was to play a central role in al-Banna’s career as an Islamic activist.”14 The duty to command the right and forbid the wrong amounts to a communal duty of the whole Muslim umma to police the behavior of all is members, intervening verbally and even physically when seeing violations of Islamic law such as drinking wine, eating during Ramadan, playing illicit music, and so forth.15

  1. Western societies are decadent and corrupt.

Al-Banna is acutely aware that his program for Islamic government is radically at odds with Western values, like personal liberty and secular government. In his writings one finds a scathing critique of Western culture in general. He lists what he takes to be the defining traits of Western society, all of which are negative.16 European life and culture “rest upon the principle of the elimination of religion from all aspects of social life, especially as regards the state, the law-court, and the school.” European society is inherently materialistic, retaining its Christianity “only as a historical heirloom.” It is marked by “Apostasy, doubt in God, denial of the soul, obliviousness to reward or punishment in the world to come, and fixation within the limits of the material, tangible existence…”

Other defining marks of European civilization are “licentiousness, unseemly dedication to pleasures, versatility in self-indulgence, unconditioned freedom for the lower instincts, gratification of the lusts of the belly and the genitals, the equipment of women with every technique of seduction and incitement…” European culture is marked by “individual selfishness,… and class selfishness…, and national selfishness, for every nation is bigoted on behalf of its members, disparages all others, and tries to engulf those which are weaker.” Its addiction to usury is a natural expression of its selfishness and materialism.

Al-Banna sums up: “These purely materialistic traits have produced within European society corruption of the spirit, the weakening of morality,”  “impotence to guarantee the security of human society” and “failure to grant men happiness.”

What is worse, the entire Muslim world is being corrupted by Western decadence: Muslim countries are being flooded with Western capital, banks, and companies; Westerners have invaded Muslim lands with “their half-naked women, their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusements, their stories, their newspapers, their novels.” Westerners have even “founded schools and scientific and cultural institutes in the very heart of the Islamic domain, which cast doubt and heresy into the souls of its sons.”17 This cultural infection of the Islamic world by Western decadence is even more dangerous than the political and military imperialism of the West.18 Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood has two fundamental goals: “(1) That the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination,… [and] (2) That a free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting according to the precepts of Islam…”19

  1. God has commanded Muslims to conquer and rule the earth.

Since divinely revealed law is superior to man-made law; and since Islam is a complete and perfect way of life, encompassing the political sphere; and since materialistic European civilization cannot but cause unhappiness, it follows that Islam must rule the world:

[T]he Noble Qur’an appoints the Muslims as guardians over humanity in its minority, and grants them the right of suzerainty and dominion over the world in order to carry out this sublime commission. Hence it is our concern, not that of the West, and it pertains to Islamic civilization, not to materialistic civilization.20

[I]t is our duty to establish sovereignty over the world and to guide all of humanity to the sound precepts of Islam and to its teachings, without which mankind cannot attain happiness.21

The founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 is often explained as a reaction against Western imperialism. This is certainly true. However, one searches in vain in al-Banna’s writings for any principled critique of imperialism per se. What al-Banna criticizes is non-Muslim, especially Western, imperialism. For Islamic imperialism al-Banna has only the most effusive praise.22 Imperialism to impose Islamic rule on non-Muslims is altogether to the good. Al-Banna is fully aware that Islam was born not only as a religion but also as an imperialistic ideology mandating the conquest of non-Muslims. The first Islamic conquerors, he writes, “produced the maximal justice and mercy reported historically of any of the nations.”23

Al-Banna is also fully aware that classical Islamic law imposes offensive war to expand the borders of the Islamic state as a communal obligation (fard al-kifaya) on the entire Muslim community.24 Indeed, al-Banna wrote an entire essay “On Jihad”25 in which he gives a survey of the Koranic verses and prophetic traditions (hadith) on jihad as well as the teachings of all four of the classical schools of Sunni jurisprudence on this topic. He reaffirms the classical teaching that “Jihad is not against polytheists alone, but against all who do not embrace Islam.”26 “[I]t is obligatory on us to begin fighting with them after transmitting the invitation [to embrace Islam], even if they do not fight against us.”27 Jews and Christians as “People of the Book” are not to be forcibly converted to Islam (unlike polytheists), but are to be forced to pay the jizya or tribute tax, as mandated by the Koran (9:29), as a sign of their humble acceptance of Islamic domination.28 Imperialism, therefore, is an obligation under Islamic law, and is wrong only when carried out by non-Muslims.

Read more at New English Review

Joseph S. Spoerl is professor of philosophy at Saint Anselm College.

The Unlikely and Dangerous Shi’ite-Sunni Terror Partnership

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The twin towers of the World Trade Center burn behind the Brooklyn Bridge

by: Ryan Mauro

On October 18, The Obama Administration again confirmed that the Shi’ite Iranian regime is working with the Sunni-Salafist Al-Qaeda terrorist group when the Treasury Department blacklistedtwo Al-Qaeda leaders operating in Iran. In July 2011, the administration revealed that Iran had struck a “secret deal” with Al-Qaeda, blowing apart the myth that the hostility between Sunni and Shi’ite Islamists precludes them from helping each other fight a common enemy.

The Treasury Department sanctioned two Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran: Muhsin al-Fadhil, the leader of the network there, and Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi. David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, describes the Iran-based network as “critically important” to Al-Qaeda operations and he stated that Iran permits its existence. The Obama Administration has repeatedly stated that Iran and Al-Qaeda work together, as chronicled by the Long War Journal.

This network has been in Iran since at least 2005, formerly under the leadership of Yasin al-Sura, with funding coming from supporters in Kuwait and Qatar. The Obama Administration disclosed the “secret deal” in July 2011. Al-Qaeda agreed not to attack Iran or to recruit operatives within the country, but it is free to use Iranian territory to move personnel and money as long as the regime is kept abreast of the activity. Strangely, this activity includes supporting Al-Qaeda elements in Syria, which are trying to topple Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, an Iranian ally.

Al-Fadhil became the leader of the network in late 2011. He began working with Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran in 2009 and was arrested by the regime. Apparently, a partnership grew while he was locked up because he took over the network shortly after he was let loose. He previously worked for Al-Qaeda in Iraq and took part in attacks on U.S. Marines in Kuwait and a French oil tanker in October 2002.

Al-Harbi oversees the movement of Al-Qaeda operatives to Afghanistan and Iraq. He also has helped Al-Qaeda with its Internet-based operations.

The Obama Administration’s accusations means there is bi-partisan agreement that the Iranian regime is sponsoring Al-Qaeda, as contradictory as it may seem. The Iranian regime helps Al-Qaeda operations in Iraq, even though these operations include massacring Shi’ites and destabilizing the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government that is increasingly close to Iran. The regime also helps Al-Qaeda operatives that are fighting against Iran’s ally in Syria. It doesn’t seem to make sense, but much of what Islamists do doesn’t make sense to Westerners.

The 9/11 Commission Report confirms that Iran and Al-Qaeda have had a relationship since late 1991 or early 1992 when its representatives began meeting in Sudan. It didn’t take long for senior Al-Qaeda operatives to go to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, where Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps operate, to learn how to make better bombs. In the fall of 1993, another group of Al-Qaeda terrorists went there to learn about explosives, intelligence and security. Osama Bin Laden was especially keen to learn how the Iranians carried out truck bombings.

Read more at Radical Islam

Ryan Mauro is RadicalIslam.org’s National Security Analyst and a fellow with the Clarion Fund. He is the founder of WorldThreats.com and is frequently interviewed on Fox News.

 

Hezbollah assassinates Colonel Wissam El Hassan

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Col. Wissam al-Hasan, head of the Internal Security Forces’ Information Branch is seen during a meeting in Beirut, Lebanon.
Credits: Mohammad Azakir/The Daily Star

By Kerry Patton for the Examiner:

Lebanon’s Internal Security Force (ISF) took a devastating blow earlier today as one of its key leaders was assassinated. Wissam El Hassan, a top official in charge of the ISF intelligence collection unit was killed along with at least 7 others.

In close proximity of Lebanon’s Phalange Party headquarters, a large vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated in the predominantly Christian district of Beirut known as Achrafieh.

Colonel Wissam El Hassan was transported to the Hotel Dieu de France Hospital recently. Upon his arrival, medical staff was quick to declare El Hassan as deceased. His passing was declared on Lebanese national television.

El Hassan, a pro-Harriri/Saudi backed official, arrested many pro-Syrian activists which included the arrest of Lebanon Government Minister Michel Samaha– a personal friend of Syrian President Bachar el Assad.

It is strongly believed after close analysis based on the type of tactic, location, and target, this incident was not orchestrated by Al Qaeda rather its Shiite rival Hezbollah–with possible cooperation that includes Syrian assets.

The victim, Wissam El Hassan, was a long-time target. He uncovered Syrian car bombs approximately one month ago put into Christian areas to foment an already tense crisis throughout the Levant.

The assassination could be construed as a message to the US and our allies in Lebanon.

The FBI created a crime lab within Lebanon’s police force as a means to promote and assist relations between the US and Lebanon. In many ways, the initiative could be observed as an “international intelligence friendship building” experiment. The Lebanese police unit created by Colonel Wisam El Hassan was considered very close to the US Intelligence Community.

Most efforts today by Lebanese Army Intelligence focuses on eying one Shiite Lebanese General in helping Hezbollah for this blast–General Jamil Al Sayed–previous director of Lebanon’s Surete Generale Agency.

General Jamil Al Sayed (Shiite) was Colonel Wismam el Hasan’s (Sunni) personal rival. The Surete Generale is controlled by the Shiites today in Lebanon while the Police are controlled by the Sunnis.

According to one source close to Lebanese Army Intelligence, Al Sayed has a hand in the assassination of Colonel Hassan.

The question is, would anyone dare arrest  Al Sayed or at least question him under these circumstances? Answering such a question can only be answered with an obvious no. As long as Hezbollah dominates and rules the ground in Lebanon, General Jamil Al Sayed is untouchable.

Hezbollah will likely never come forward claiming responsibility for Colonel Hassan’s death as they rarely come forward claiming the responsibility of anyone’s death. With a little deductive reasoning based on key facts, its pretty obvious who killed the Colonel–Hezbollah.

Kerry Patton, a combat disabled veteran, is the author of Contracted: America’s Secret Warriors (scheduled release Dec, 2012.). You can follow him on Facebook or at kerry-patton.com.

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Major terror attack unfolds in Lebanon

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Blast site in Achrafieh, Beirut, Lebanon Credits:
Yorgo El Bittar

By Kerry Patton for the Examiner:

Editors Note: This is breaking news and updates will be revealed as more details come forward.

A major terrorist attack unfolded in the heavily populated Christian district in Beirut, Lebanon known as Achrafieh. According to numerous social media feeds predominantly coming out of Twitter and Facebook, no terrorist organization has claimed responsibility at this time.

So far, the numbers of persons killed remains unknown. Many persons have been severely injured. For individuals near Hotel Dieu, a field trauma site has been established and medical teams are searching for persons to donate blood.

Chatter is filling the internet with mixed reports. Hezbollah, a terrorist proxy for Iran, is accusing Al Qaeda for the incident. This is one of the first times the world has heard of Hezbollah pointing a finger at its Sunni counterpart Al Qaeda. Yes, Hezbollah has accused its Sunni rivals in the past of certain incidents but never this fast after an incident and never in a communique that has spread like a wildfire across the globe.

Al Qaeda on the other hand is accusing members founded in the March 14 alliance who hold close ties with Bashir Assad in Syria. Hezbollah is one of those members aligned with the March 14 alliance.Al Qaeda has found its way into Lebanon making serious headway in shifting geo-politics with more Sunni influence.

This explosion and the constant finer pointing could lead to a devastating crisis inside the Middle East. If Al Qaeda and Hezbollah continue to point fingers, the largest terror versus terror war could ensue.

The crisis in Syria makes sense as a center of gravity having influence over this incident. Hezbollah fighters once assisted Assad’s forces. Many of them returned back to Lebanon when Syrian rebels seized certain strongholds. Their withdrawal from Syria could be viewed as a sign of weakness.

Sunni backed militants in Syria oppose the Alawite regime. Assad’s Alawite regime is predominantly backed by Shiites in Iran. The Sunni’s fighting Assad comprises of large pools of Al Qaeda fighters, many of which are foreign fighters from across the Middle East.

Syria is the ultimate Sunni versus Shiite civil war. That war may have just moved into Lebanon.

Updates will continue as more details unfold.

Kerry Patton, a combat disabled veteran, is the author of Contracted: America’s Secret Warriors (scheduled release Dec, 2012.). You can follow him on Facebook or at kerry-patton.com.