The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) national office has posted an article on their Twitter feed by leftwing ideologue Noam Chomsky titled “Boston and Beyond-When we experience terror at home, we must remember the United States’s use of terror abroad.” In 2008, the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (GMBDR) presented an analysis that identified four conceptual categories into which Brotherhood positions on terrorism can usually be parsed. The GMBDR noted that this Muslim Brotherhood strategy regarding terrorism should be seen for what it is, a remarkably consistent and internally coherent means of obscuring the true aims and goals of the group. The third category of that strategy is:
3. DEFENSE- Having staked out the positions that Islam is not violent and that Jihad is not connected with violence, the Brotherhood is left with the task of defending the violence carried out by Islamist groups. Since according to the Brotherhood these groups cannot, by definition, be motivated by Islamic ideology, there can be only one answer- they are fighting because of “legitimate grievances” and hence are “freedom fighters.” This defense of Islamist violence is mounted differently for Brotherhood-related groups such as Hamas as opposed to Al Qaeda. Because of the visible dispute over land, it is easy for the Brotherhood to suggest that the actions of Palestinian terror groups such as Hamas are based on such grievances whereas, in reality, the Brotherhood has managed to turn the conflict into a religious war. The most viable strategy for the Brotherhood in the West is to posit that the problem is “Occupation“, leaving it to the audience to figure out whether the reference is to 1967 or 1947. Given the sensitivity in the West towards terrorism at home, the Brotherhood has a far more difficult job explaining Al Qaeda terrorism which is does by suggesting that while nothing “justifies” such terrorism, Al Qaeda actions spring from justified anger at U.S. foreign policy. This strategy provides a natural interface” for the Brotherhood with the political far-left and, in Europe, the Brotherhood has been successful in forging such alliances.
At one point, Chomsky’s writes:
There are few in Boston who were not touched in some way by the marathon bombings on April 15 and the tense week that followed. Several friends of mine were at the finish line when the bombs went off. Others live close to where Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the second suspect, was captured. The young police officer Sean Collier was murdered right outside my office building. It’s rare for privileged Westerners to see, graphically, what many others experience daily—for example, in a remote village in Yemen, the same week as the marathon bombings.
On April 23, Yemeni activist and journalist Farea Al-Muslimi, who had studied at an American high school, testified before a U.S. Senate committee that right after the marathon bombings, a drone strike in his home village in Yemen killed its target. The strike terrorized the villagers, turning them into enemies of the United States—something that years of jihadi propaganda had failed to accomplish.
This is yet another of the myriad attempts that MPAC and other US Muslim Brotherhood organizations have made to blame Islamist violence on US foreign policy. A post from last month discussed an article by an official of the Canadian Counsel on American Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) that neatly exemplified each of the four strategies conveniently presented in the same order as the GMBDR analysis.
Read more at the NEW Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch (replacing GMBDR)