The Development of Home-Grown Jihadist Radicalisation in Italy

Barcelona muslimsBY LORENZO VIDINO, PH.D.

Theme:

The Muslim communities and jihadist networks in Italy and Spain present similar characteristics and it is therefore interesting to look at the recent development of home-grown jihadist radicalisation in Italy.[1]

Summary:

Over the last three years the demographic and operational features of jihadism in Italy have shown significant shifts. The first generation of foreign-born militants with ties to various jihadist groups outside Europe is still active, although less intensely than in the past. The Italian authorities, however, have increasingly noted forms of home-grown radicalisation similar to those recorded in other West European countries over the past 10 years.

The lag has been caused by a simple demographic factor. As in Spain, large-scale Muslim immigration to Italy began only in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some 20 (in some cases 30 or 40) years later than in economically more developed European countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The first, relatively large, second generation of Italian-born Muslims is therefore coming of age only now, as the sons of the first immigrants are becoming adults in their adoptive country. Of these hundreds of thousands of young men and women, a statistically insignificant yet security-relevant number is embracing radical ideas.

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The characteristics of Italian home-grown jihadism

The current panorama of jihadism in Italy is extremely fragmented and diverse, marked by the presence of various actors with very different features. ‘Traditional’ networks, although weakened by the waves of arrests and expulsions carried out by the authorities over the past 15 years, are still active.[20] But cases like those of Jarmoune, El Abboubi and Delnevo indicate that a home-grown jihadism with characteristics similar to the phenomenon seen over the past few years throughout central and northern Europe has reached Italy. Three cases do not make a trend, but there are indications that these cases are not isolated incidents but, rather, the most visible manifestations of a bigger phenomenon. A 2012 intelligence report for the Italian Parliament, in fact, alerted to the presence of several individuals ‘belonging to the second generation of immigrants and Italian converts who are characterized by an uncompromising interpretation of Islam and attitudes of intolerance towards Western customs’.[21]

Home-grown jihadism in Italy is, so far, a substantially smaller phenomenon than in most central and northern European countries. Providing exact numbers is an impossible task, but, according to research conducted by the author and conversations with several senior Italian counterterrorism officials, it can be argued that the individuals actively involved in this new home-grown jihadist scene number around 40 to 50. Similarly, it can be argued that the number of those in various ways and in varying degrees sympathising with jihadism is somewhere in the lower hundreds. It is, in substance, a small milieu of individuals with varying sociological characteristics (age, sex, ethnic origin, education and social condition) who share a commitment to jihadist ideology. Most of them are scattered throughout northern Italy, from big cities like Milan and Bologna to tiny villages. A few are located in the centre or the south of the country.

It should be clarified that most of these individuals have not been involved in any violent activity. Most of them limit their commitment to jihadist ideology to an often frantic online activity aimed at publishing and disseminating material that ranges from the purely theological to the operational. While this activity at times represents a violation of the Italian penal code, most prospective home-grown Italian jihadists are just that –hopefuls– and do not resort to violence. Yet, as the cases of Jarmoune, El Abboubi and Delnevo show, some members of this country-wide informal scene occasionally make –or attempt to make– the leap from the keyboard to the real world. Why, when and how that leap from virtual to actual militancy happens is the subject of much debate and concern among counterterrorism officials and experts.

It is possible to identify some characteristics that are common to this new scenario. The first is their detachment from Italian mosques. In some cases home-grown militants do not frequent them of their own volition, either because they consider them not to be in tune with their interpretation of Islam or because they fear surveillance by the authorities. But, in most cases, it is mosque officials who make it clear to the militants that certain views and activities are not tolerated on their premises. Most Italian mosques have, in the words of Claudio Galzerano –one of the experts in Italian counterterrorism–, the ‘right antibodies’ and avoid ‘bad apples’.

The new scenario also seems to be unconnected with the ‘traditional’ jihadists and their mosques. There are various factors that might explain this. One appears to be the linguistic barrier between the two groups. While militants of the first generation are largely North Africans whose native language is Arabic and whose fluency in Italian is often limited, the home-grown activists have the opposite characteristics, often hampering communication between the two.

But arguably more important in explaining the disconnection between the two groups is the diffidence with which traditional structures view the new home-grown generation. The secretive and risk-averse traditional structures, in fact, appear unreceptive to the newcomers. It is likely that they might suspect some of the home-grown activists, particularly Italian converts, to be spies seeking to infiltrate them. Even if the veracity of the home-grown activists’ commitment is proved, in many cases their behaviour is deemed to be risky. Many of them, in fact, dress (long white robes, military fatigues, long beard…) or act in extremely conspicuous ways. They often openly express their radical views online or in various public venues. This sort of conduct, which inevitably attracts the attention of the authorities, makes the new home-grown activists extremely unattractive to the eyes of traditionalists.

Completely at odds with mainstream mosques and Islamic organisations, shunned by established jihadist networks and operating as individuals or small clusters throughout the national territory, Italian home-grown activists have created their own scene, which is mostly Internet-based. It is, in fact, on various blogs, Facebook and other online social media that this tiny community comes together.

A handful of individuals are the key connectors in this scene, being extremely active online (and, in some cases, also in the real world) and in constant communication with many other online users. Unlike most of the militants of the first generation, who were only passive consumers of online propaganda, this new generation of home-grown activists are also often active producers of their own jihadist material. Jarmoune, El Abboubi, Delnevo and many others, in fact, translated and posted various texts and produced their own videos –in some cases of a remarkable quality–.

A problem of integration?

Understanding the factors that make an individual become radicalised has been one of the most controversial subjects of the terrorism-related academic and policymaking debate of the past 15 years.[22] Theories explaining the phenomenon abound but most experts agree that every case is different and that in most cases it is a combination of factors, rather than just one, that radicalise an individual. One of the factors often mentioned in the debate on radicalisation among European Muslims is lack of integration. Particularly in the first part of the 2000s many argued that the root of the problem was the marginalisation, disenfranchisement and discrimination felt by many European Muslims. Unwilling to tolerate these miserable conditions, the theory argued that some of them chose jihadism as a way of challenging the system and taking their revenge.

Over the past few years this theory has been criticised by many experts who believe it has no empirical basis. First, an analysis of the cases of home-grown jihadists in both Europe and North America has shown that many, if not most, have not been subject to socio-economic disenfranchisement. Many are indeed drifters, individuals who have suffered problems ranging from substance abuse to chronic unemployment. But many are university students or relatively successful professionals, often faring much better than most of their peers. Moreover, the theory linking radicalisation to the lack of socio-economic integration is flawed because it does not explain why only a statistically insignificant minority of the many European Muslims that unquestionably live in condition of disenfranchisement become radicalised. It is obvious that other factors must determine the phenomenon.

While it is impossible to provide answers that are applicable to all cases, it can be argued that socio-economic disenfranchisement, while playing a role, is not a determining factor in the radicalisation of the vast majority of European Muslims. Perhaps the answers lies in another kind of integration, more difficult to assess but arguably more important. Integration in the sense of a sense of belonging to a certain society, irrespective of one’s socio-economic conditions, appears to be a more important factor. Many European Muslims who radicalise are individuals confused about their identity and that find a sense of belonging in a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam rather than in a European identity.

Moreover, traditionally, many young men of all socio-economic conditions have been attracted by radical ideas. Limiting the analysis just to Italy, many of the individuals that joined both left- and right-wing militant groups that bloodied the country’s streets in the 1970s and early 1980s were university students and scions of middle (and, in some cases, upper) class families. The personal desire for rebellion, meaning, camaraderie and adventure are factors that are not secondary when analysing radicalisation patterns.

The argument that the roots of radicalisation should be sought in an individual’s psychological profile and his search for a personal identity is supported by the analysis of the few cases seen so far of Italian home-grown jihadists. Neither Jarmoune nor El Abboubi can be considered to be poorly integrated from a socio-economic perspective. Both lived with their families in more than decent dwellings in small towns in the province of Brescia. Jarmoune worked for a company that installed electrical systems and had a permanent contract, a luxury lacked by many of his Italian peers.[23] El Abboubi studied at a local school. The families of both individuals are described by most as well integrated.[24]

This argument can be applied to Delnevo’s case with an even greater significance. Born in a middle-class Italian Catholic family, Delnevo had none of the integration problems attributed by some to European Muslims who become radicalised. It is obvious that in the Delnevo’s case –but no differently from Jarmoune and El Abboubi– the roots of his radicalisation are in his personal traits and his unwillingness, rather than his inability, to fit into Italian society. All three young men struggled to find an identity and flirted with various alternative ideologies (it is in this regard interesting that Delnevo had a fascination with fascism and El Abboubi with hip hop) before embracing jihadism. But this trajectory seems to be clearly dictated by an intellectual development determined by personal choices and not by any kind of socio-economic disenfranchisement.

Read more at Clarion Project

Lorenzo Vidino is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) and a lecturer at the University of Zurich. A native of Milan, Italy, he holds a law degree from the University of Milan Law School and a Doctorate in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston. This article originally appeared  in Real Instituto Elcano on February 14th 2014.

An Island in Revolt: A Window into Europe’s Future

2011_Italy_BenEssay-450x325

…there’s a limit to what indigenous populations can take

By :

One could be justified for being perplexed about Pope Francis’s choice of Lampedusa, a tiny island off the coast of Sicily and Italy’s — indeed Europe’s — southernmost tip, as the destination of his very first official visit, which took place on July 8. Not a world capital, not a place in some important geopolitical region of the globe.

What is significant, even symbolic, about Lampedusa is its geography: The small island, with a population of 5,000, is positioned in the middle of the Mediterranean, making it close to the Muslim world, even closer to Tunisia than Sicily.

These two conditions explain what’s been happening to Lampedusa for over a decade, and how it could be a miniature model of the whole of Europe in the not-too-distant future.

Since at least 2001, Lampedusa has been a primary entry point into Europe for immigrants, mostly illegal from Africa. Tens of thousands have been landing here over the years, peaking during the “Arab Spring.” In 2011, according to a report of the United Nation’s Human Rights Council, “[a]pproximately 60,000 irregular migrants arrived [in Italy] as part of the 2011 influx from North Africa,” mainly from Tunisia and Libya. Around 50,000 of these came to Lampedusa.

Over 10,000 received residence permits on humanitarian grounds, because the Italian government declared a state of humanitarian emergency in February 2011, subsequently extended until December 2012.

In Lampedusa, the temporary immigrant reception center where outsiders were accommodated and sent to other facilities where they could request asylum, became so overcrowded that thousands of people had to sleep outdoors and in shelters provided by the local parish and ordinary Lampedusans.

The immigrants, among whom were suspected escaped prisoners, were given temporary visas and then gradually transferred to mainland Italy and other EU countries, but there were many times when the number of newcomers was higher than that of the locals.

On those occasions, when natives were outnumbered, there were tales of local women having to be accompanied everywhere to protect them from immigrants’ unwanted attention, sacked shops, apartment doors forced open, people returning home to find Tunisians sitting at the dining table eating and, after the intruders’ departure, some householders even discovering faeces inside saucepans.

The island became what one newspaper called “a huge immigrant camp.”

Maybe expecting to find a hotel reception and with scarcely a thought about the crisis they were creating on the small island, the illegal immigrants were complaining, as in the video below, describing what they found in Lampedusa as “shameful” and pontificating “the reception is zero” as if they were giving a hotel review on TripAdvisor:

 

This video confirms what Lampedusa Mayor Bernardino De Rubeis said: “We have here young Tunisians who arrogantly want everything immediately, just like criminals, ready to endanger our lives and theirs.” He later added: “We’re in a war, and the people will react. There are people here who want to go out into the streets armed with clubs.”

Read more at Front Page

The Islamization of Italy

by Giulio Meotti

The Italian authorities have capitulated to hatred.

It began when thousands of Muslims marched in front of Milan’s Duomo to protest against Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, burning Israeli flags and chanting anti-Jewish slogans, Joaquin Navarro-Valls, John Paul II’s spokesman for 22 years, defended the “freedom of expression” of the Muslims who burned the Star of David.

Last week, Italian education minister Francesco Profumo proposed that Islam be taught in public schools alongside the traditional teaching of Catholicism, while Bishop Mariano Crociata, secretary general of the Italian Episcopal Conference, announced that the Vatican is in favor of building new mosques in Italy.

The European Bishops met with European Muslims in Turin to proclaim the need for the “progressive enculturation of Islam in Europe.”

Italy’s Terrorist Legacy

Sheikh Abu Iyad is the major Islamist wanted for the terror attack against the U.S. consultate in Benghazi, Libya. It was just been discovered that two of his handmen are Sami Essid Ben Khemais and Mehdi Kammoun. They both lived in Italy between Milano and Gallarate and they spent seven years in Italian prisons for terrorism.

Italy leads the ranking in Europe as paradise for “martyrs,” imams of hatred and terrorists involved in major terror attacks.

Twenty-nine of the suicide bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan came from Italy.

Eight of the terrorists jailed in Guantanamo Bay are Italians.

Hussien Saber Fadhil, who has been called “the caliph,” is the Iraqi arrested in Venice and considered the Italian link with al Qaeda. He sent money to the Palestinian Arab terror groups as well.

The most well known “Italian” terrorist is Abu Farid Al Masri, the suicide bomber who destroyed the United Nations’ building in Baghdad in 2003, killing dozens of civilians.

From Milan came Kamal Morchidi, who blew himself up at the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, nearly killing then-US undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz.

The Growing Italian Islamization

The terrorist proliferation is a symbol of growing Italian  Islamization: There were 600,000 Muslims in Italy in the year 2000, over 1,300,000 in 2009, over 1.5 million today, and they are expected to get to 2.8 million by 2030.

The southern island of Sicily is about to become the site of a shining new multi-million Euro mega-mosque paid for by Qatar.

The Mosque of Rome, which accommodates more than 12,000 people, is one of the largest mosques in Europe. It is there that the imam, an Egyptian Islamist, was suspended after preaching jihad.

There are now an estimated 500 mosques in Italy, and 70 % of these are controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, not to mention thousands of informal Islamic prayer centers and Koranic schools.

In Italy, a new Islamic place of worship is established on the average of every four days.

Honor Killings: A New Episode Every Week

And every week there are new episodes of violence against Muslim women committed in the name of Sharia, Islamic law:

Bouchra, 24, was stabbed to death in Verona by her husband because she refused to wear the veil and was living “like a Westerner”;

Kabira, 28, was stabbed to death by her husband because she wanted to wear “Western clothes”;

Darin Omar was killed by her husband because she had got a job in a call center;

Hina Salem was suffocated with a plastic bag by the family, beheaded and buried with her head facing La Mecca because she dated an Italian boy and refused a forced marriage;

Saamali Fatima was killed on a highway at Aosta;

Malka, 29, was strangled by her husband for her “Western” habits;

Fatima, 20, was stabbed to death by her boyfriend for being “too independent”;

Sobia was poisoned by family members;

Naima was stabbed by her husband because she wanted back her children seized in Morocco;

Fouzia was strangled by her husband under the eyes of their three-year old daughter, her body abandoned in a public garden, because she had begun to follow a “modern lifestyle”;

Sanaa Dafan was slaughtered by her father in Pordenone for a relationship with an Italian boy;

Amal, 26, beaten by her husband simply because she wanted to go to the hairdresser.

Anti-Semitism Grows alongside Multiculturalism

Anti-Semitism grows alongside this horrible “multiculturalism.”

The Italian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood released a version of the Koran that contains remarks describing Jews as morally duplicitous and as a people of rejects and swindlers. In several of the footnotes interpreting the text, the commentator, an Italian convert to Islam, suggested Jews are responsible for their own misfortunes and accuses them of being “champions of moral duplicity” who consider as  “acceptable any wickedness toward non-Jews.”

Meanwhile, the Italian judges are apologetic about hatred. Ucoii, the largest Islamic organization in Italy, published an ad in many mainstream newspapers titled, “Nazi Bloodshed Yesterday, Israeli Bloodshed Today.” An Italian court ruled that the Nazification of Israel came under “freedom of expression” and was not a case of incitement to hatred.

Read more at Radical Islam

Islamic Conferation Seeks to Create Parallel Society in Italy

by: Soeren Kern at Radical Islam:

More than 250 mosques across Italy have reached an agreement to create a new umbrella organization, the Italian Islamic Confederation(CII).

The CII will be controlled by Morocco, and will compete with an existing Muslim umbrella organization, the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII).

A mosque in Florence

The UCOII, which is estimated to control 60% of the mosques in Italy, is closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since its founding in 1990, the UCOII has used its virtual monopoly over the mosques in Italy to spread its Islamist ideology over the 1.5 million Muslims in the country. The UCOII has also worked to become the main interlocutor between the Muslim community and the Italian state.

But the Italian government has ruled out reaching an agreement with the UCOII because of its links to the Muslim Brotherhood. “There can be no accords with those like the UCOII, who de facto deny the existence of the state of Israel and hold ambiguous positions on terrorism at the national and local level,” according to Andrea Ronchi, Italy’s former Minister for Community Policy.

After it came to light that the majority of the mosques in Italy are controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni called for a moratorium on the building of new mosques until a new national law could be written to regulate the phenomenon.

According to Manes Bernardini, a politician with the Northern League in Bologna, “Mosques are springing up like mushrooms, and mayors can do nothing about it because there is no national law to regulate the proliferation of these structures.”

In this context, the creation of the CII on March 22 is an attempt by the Moroccan government to establish a new Muslim umbrella organization that would represent a more “moderate” face of Islam vis-à-vis the Italian government.

CII’s founding document states that it “respects the holiness of life” and “rejects every form of violence.” The document also says the CII “respects the principles of moderation, tolerance and respect towards others,” and will “promote and defend the rights of Muslim women in Italy.”

 A mosque in Rome

The primary motive behind the creation of the CII, which is being run by a Moroccan named Fihri Wahid, appears to be an effort to persuade the Italian government to approve and subsidize the construction of more mosques in the country. CII’s founding document states: “Creating the best conditions in order to guarantee dignity and freedom of worship, underlining the importance that places of worship reflect the creative genius and the splendor of Italian culture towards the prospect of integration and dialogue with the other religions present in the country.”

According to Hassan Abouyoub, the Moroccan Ambassador to Italy, the establishment of the CII is “an historic achievement. It will finally allow the Muslim population in Italy to have a new voice.” Abouyoub added: “The mosques which are taking part in this new confederation are only of the Maliki tradition, which respect a moderate Islam.”

The Maliki tradition refers to a school of Islamic Sharia law that is practiced in Morocco and other parts of North Africa. In fact, the “moderate” Maliki school of Islam is the official state religion in Morocco, where Christians are frequently harassed and often expelled from the country without due process, allegedly for proselytizing.

With the creation of the CII, Morocco is attempting to export to Italy a religious control strategy that is working very well in neighboring Spain, where the Moroccan government has been using an umbrella organization called the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI), to exert control over the religious and cultural beliefs and practices of the nearly one million Moroccan immigrants who reside in Spain.

According to a leaked secret report prepared by Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI), excerpts of which have been published by the Madrid-based El País newspaper, the Moroccan government is aggressively implementing “a strategy of great magnitude” that involves establishing a parallel Muslim society in Spain by discouraging Moroccans from integrating into their host country, and by encouraging them instead to live an Islamic lifestyle isolated from Spanish society.

Read more…

Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook.

This article appeared originally on GatestoneInstitute.org.