“We need to fight Sharia supremacism”

President Bush’s visit to the Islamic Center of Washington (DC) after 9/11.  On the right is Hamas Leader Nihad Awad (CAIR), and on the left is Khalid Saffuri (deputy to Al Qaeda operative Alamoudi)

Center for Security Policy, by Christopher Hull, September 12, 2018:

On OAN’s “Tipping Point With Liz Wheeler,” the Center’s Executive VP Christopher Hull highlighted the problem of President George W. Bush proclaiming that “Islam is peace” in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and he spoke about the higher global death toll from terrorism in 2014 compared to 2001, noting that he believes the surge has decreased under Trump due to the president’s firm stance against Islamic terrorism.

17 Years After 9/11, Al-Qaeda Boasts ‘Strongest Fighting Force in Its Existence

RAMI AL-SAYED/AFP/Getty Images

Breitbart, by John Hayward, September 11, 2018:

Seventeen years after it perpetrated the September 11 terrorist attack, al-Qaeda is arguably stronger and better-positioned than ever.

The consensus on al-Qaeda’s strength among terrorism experts is a sobering rebuke to the notion that al-Qaeda was dealt a mortal wound when its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in May 2011.

Al-Qaeda’s health is measured by three vital statistics: its military strength, its ideological strength, and the size of its sphere of influence. All three of those metrics were unfortunately boosted as an inevitable side effect of the Western war against al-Qaeda’s chief rival, the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda picked up recruits, forged new alliances, and won its ideological argument with its rabid ISIS offshoot as the Islamic State “caliphate” was destroyed.

Al-Qaeda made sure it was perfectly positioned to pick up the pieces after the ISIS caliphate exploded. It exploited the dramatic discrediting of the Islamic State, which advocated seizing and holding vast amounts of territory to forge an apocalyptic Islamist nation-state that could be targeted and destroyed by mighty Western military forces – not to mention various othermuch more well-established Islamist nation-states threatened by the Islamic State’s existence, such as Iran.

An assessment at the Sydney Morning Herald on Tuesday found al-Qaeda boasting the “largest fighting force in its existence.”

“Estimates say it may have more than 20,000 militants in Syria and Yemen alone. It boasts affiliates across North Africa, the Levant (including Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon) and parts of Asia, and it remains strong around the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,” the SMH reported.

Al-Qaeda has done fairly well for itself in Syria, amassing weapons and trained fighters through its network of allies, exploiting both the war against the Islamic State and the bloody chaos of the horrendous Syrian civil war.

At the peak of its power in 2015, al-Qaeda was able to instantly dismantle and disarm the absurdly small “moderate” rebel force President Barack Obama sent into Syria with American training and weapons. Times are harder for al-Qaeda franchisees in Syria these days, but the international organization got what it wanted from the conflict and continues ruthlessly exploiting the ugly truth that it was always one of the few enemies of dictator Bashar Assad’s regime with significant battlefield power. Assad and his allies routinely accuse the West of aiding and abetting terrorists by prolonging the insurrection and dismiss all enemies of the regime as “terrorists.”

Al-Qaeda is very strong in Yemen and Libya – strong enough in Yemen to convince the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Iran-backed Houthi insurgency to pay off al-Qaeda fighters instead of engaging them in combat. Here again, al-Qaeda has cunningly positioned itself as the lesser of two evils, and perhaps even an ally of the United States and its coalition against a more pressing military threat.

“Elements of the U.S. military are clearly aware that much of what the U.S. is doing in Yemen is aiding AQAP and there is much angst about that. However, supporting the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against what the U.S. views as Iranian expansionism takes priority over battling AQAP and even stabilizing Yemen,” Jamestown Foundation fellow Michael Horton told the Associated Press in August.

The AP noted that al-Qaeda forces that struck deals with the advancing Saudi coalition have been allowed to fall back with “weapons, equipment, and wads of looted cash.” Some al-Qaeda fighters have been actively recruited by the anti-Houthi operation, according to the AP’s sources. Such arrangements risk providing al-Qaeda with even more valuable military training, and possibly hardware, not to mention mixing subversive elements into Arab military units.

In Libya, al-Qaeda swiftly exploited the chaos unleashed by President Barack Obama’s invasion and the fall of dictator Moammar Qaddafi – who was, despite his many, many flaws, a critic of Osama bin Laden and paranoid about the threat jihadi groups like al-Qaeda posed to his power.

The U.S. military has been working with the internationally-recognized government of Libya – which controls only a portion of the country – to conduct airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets.

The Islamist contagion from Libya has been spreading across Africa, prompting an American response described as a “shadow war” largely invisible to the public until U.S. troops were killed in a terrorist ambush in Niger.

Al-Qaeda’s splinter group Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (literally, “The Group to Support Islam and Muslims”) is one of the major regional threats. It was officially designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. government last week. The huge new American drone base under construction in Niger will be capable of launching strikes into Libya against al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups.

Al-Qaeda retains a dangerous presence in Iraq, thanks in part to a political strategy similar to the one it followed in Yemen and Libya, presenting itself to locals and government officials as an alternative to ISIS and Iran-backed Shiite militia. Constant ISIS threats to reorganize in Syria and Iraq help to drag the spotlight away from al-Qaeda’s stealthier activities. It is not easy to tell where ISIS ends and al-Qaeda begins in Iraq, which was the scene of the al-Qaeda schism that created the Islamic State.

The al-Qaeda network even has tentacles in Iran, where some of the group’s leaders fled after the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan. Questions about how much help the Iranian government gave al-Qaeda or whether Tehran actively cooperates with the terrorist network are hotly debated.

Al-Qaeda’s strategic alliances have proven more useful and durable than the Islamic State’s frenzied efforts to pressure jihadi groups into pledging allegiance. The most infamous of these allies, the Taliban of Afghanistan, have endured 17 years of U.S. and allied military operations and currently control at least a quarter of the country.

The Taliban is very close to achieving one of its major objectives: direct talks with the U.S. government. It is difficult to imagine a negotiated peace with the Taliban that would not infuse the Afghan constitution with their ideology and put Taliban members in top government and military positions, which are both highly desirable outcomes for al-Qaeda. A United Nations panel confirmed in June that al-Qaeda remains closely allied with the Taliban. The Afghan group’s stubborn refusal to abandon al-Qaeda under decades of immense Western military pressure greatly enhances the prestige of the international terrorist organization.

Al-Qaeda’s allies in Somalia, al-Shabaab, are such an active threat that American forces have been obliged to bomb them as well. Over twenty U.S. airstrikes have been conducted against al-Shabaab in Somalia this year, a significant increase in operational tempo since the end of the Obama administration. Somalia is one of the few African theaters where the Trump administration openly plans to maintain a U.S. military presence.

Al-Qaeda’s ideological threat is the most difficult aspect of the group’s persistence for Western analysts and policymakers to discuss. Simply put, the past 17 years have conclusively disproved the old bromide that al-Qaeda and its allies were a “tiny minority of extremists” that “hijacked” the religion of Islam. We may hope they remain a minority and they certainly are extreme, but they definitely are not “tiny.”

The Taliban’s persistence is an instructive example of the strength of al-Qaeda’s religious ideology. The Taliban have been fighting a brutal war of attrition against Afghan security forces and American troops for almost two decades. They usually suffer at least as many casualties as they inflict, but they have no difficulty recruiting fresh troops. It is likewise difficult to point to an area where al-Qaeda is having trouble replenishing its manpower.

In other theaters, al-Qaeda appears to be enjoying considerable success at recruiting former members of the Islamic State and its allied organizations, themselves persistent despite defeats in Syria and Iraq that would seem to demolish their claim to preside over a caliphate.

There is little evidence that jihadi groups activated by bin Laden’s network are growing discouraged and giving up the fight; instead, they look for better leadership when their old gang is beaten. Al-Qaeda’s growing influence in Asia is grim evidence that their appeal extends beyond Arabs. Conventional wisdom in the West now holds that “nation-building” is sheer folly in any theater where al-Qaeda or its offshoots have a strong presence – which is another way of conceding that its jihad ideology is too popular to extinguish by defeating its armed forces or killing its leaders, and it is too strong for moderate Muslim political leaders to overwhelm.

If there is any good news in this grim picture of al-Qaeda’s strength in 2018, it is that Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network has endured and prospered largely by abandoning flashy big-ticket terrorist attacks like 9/11. Analysts routinely credit al-Qaeda’s relative subtlety, its interest in developing political strength, and long-term alliances instead of drawing attention to itself as ISIS does for its survival.

The question is how long al-Qaeda will be content to fight its adversaries in the Middle East and Asia instead of slaughtering American and European civilians. The United Nations warned in August that al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden’s vengeful son Hamza, could become a more active global threat as ISIS fades and its fighters migrate back to their parent organization. Al-Qaeda does hold territory in places like Libya and Yemen, giving it the kind of money, recruiting appeal, and striking power that made ISIS so dangerous.

An Arab News assessment on Monday of the strategic threat posed by al-Qaeda pointed out that al-Qaeda could be waiting for some of the Islamic State’s key allies in Africa, Egypt, and Pakistan to switch allegiance back to them before making big global moves:

It is obvious that Al-Qaeda has been largely left alone in recent years, as global and regional powers vented their anger against Daesh, which was undoubtedly a bigger and more immediate threat. But the situation could change if Al-Qaeda is able to undertake new attacks, particularly against the US and its Western allies. That it has failed to do so until now was primarily due to its declining power and failure to attract more recruits

Al-Qaeda’s strength and sophistication are undeniable. They are playing a much longer game than the Islamic State, and they have learned to play it carefully – but eventually, they will make more aggressive moves, because they still believe making war against the West is necessary.

Seventeen years after 9/11, America endures. So does the enemy.

Americans Will Win This War In the Shadows of the Heroes of Flight 93

Understanding the Threat, by John Guandolo, September 10, 2018:

On 9/11/2001, the U.S. Government failed to protect America, and Islamic jihadis flew planes into two World Trade Center buildings in New York (American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175) and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia (American Airlines flight 77) killing nearly 3,000 people.

     

But on United Airlines flight 93, average American citizens demonstrated leadership, courage, and initiative and gave the last full measure of devotion to this nation by ensuring that airplane would not be used to do the kind of devastation we saw in New York and Arlington.

And so it is today.  Citizens will win or lose this war at the local level.

It is 2018.  Contrary to U.S. warfighting doctrine, the United States government has still not identified the “enemy” we face in this war.  You cannot hit the bullseye if there is no target.

Since 9/11, 159 Americans have been killed and 502 wounded in 71 jihadi attacks perpetrated by muslims in 24 different states inside America.

Texas leads the nations with eight (8) separate attacks.

Fifteen (15) of the nineteen (19) Islamic jihadis who attacked America on 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia.  Evidence exists revealing Saudi intelligence operatives conducted a “dry run” for the 9/11 attacks one year prior to 9/11/01, and the Saudi Ambassador to the United States – Prince Bandar – and his wife passed money to an account used to support 9/11 hijackers.

Yet, the United States government calls Saudi Arabia an “ally” in the “War on Terror.”

Pakistani Intelligence helped move Al Qaeda personnel on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, and Osama bin Laden lived for years in Pakistan less than a mile from the Pakistani Military Academy.

Yet, the United States government calls Pakistan and “ally” in the “War on Terror.”

U.S. military generals, State Department officials, National Security advisors, and directors of U.S. intelligence agencies continue to rely upon Islamic “coalition partners” and Islamic advisors to tell them how to fight the war.

We LOST the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is not because our military soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen failed to do their jobs – it is because our generals/admirals and civilian leaders failed and continue to fail to Understand the Threat and identify the enemy.

Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Hizbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Abu Sayef, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb u Tahrir, Jamaat e Islami, Tabligi Jamaat, and all Islamic nations on the planet under the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) clearly state they intend to establish an Islamic State (caliphate) under sharia (Islamic law) through all means necessary.

The enemy very clearly makes their intentions known.  The enemy is not the problem.  Our leaders are the problem.

U.S. leadership has failed and continues to fail America and Americans are dead because of it – nearly 700 killed or wounded since 9/11 here at home.

President Trump stands virtually alone in this administration as someone who has some semblance of an understanding Islam is the problem and sharia is the threat doctrine of our enemy.

Because of all of this, this war will be won or lost at the local level.

Here is what citizens must do if America is to win this war:

  1. Know and understand sharia.  Speak truth boldly.
  2. Organize citizens who understand the threat into small teams to focus their efforts on educating and activating:  police; prosecutors and judges; legislators; pastors/rabbis; school officials; business leaders (chamber of commerce); and local politicians.
  3. Give each team simple focused tasks.
  4. POLICE:  Give a copy of the book Raising a Jihadi Generation and the UTT Episode 1 DVD to your local police chief and sheriff.  Encourage your local police chief and sheriff to bring the UTT’s 3-day “Understanding and Investigating the Jihadi Network” course to their jurisdiction.  This is the only program of its kind in the U.S. which gives police tools to map out, investigate and prosecute the jihadi network in your community.
  5. PROSECUTORS/JUDGES:  Share UTT information with prosecutors and judges you know, and encourage them to host a UTT training.  If able, show them examples of the jihadi network in their city/county and how they operate – ie they (suit-wearing jihadis) portray themselves as helpful and friendly yet still have the same objectives as Al Qaeda.
  6. LEGISLATORS:  Work with patriots involved with legislative efforts at your state house to increase the strength of state Racketeering statutes and increase the list of predicate crimes to include “Terrorism.”  Work to make “Conspiring to overthrow the state constitution” a state felony in your state.
  7. PASTORS/RABBIS:  Educate local church leaders, including pastors, about the threat of Islam and encourage them to cease all “Interfaith Outreach” as it is today, since all U.S. interfaith outreach efforts are driven by the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood via the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).
  8. SCHOOL OFFICIALS:  Firmly ensure Islam is not being taught in your local schools, nor are children compelled to openly state the shahada (Islamic statement of faith).  Work with organizations like TruthinTextbooks.com to ensure social studies and history books are actually teaching historical facts not revisionist history.  Ensure the school board, principles, PTA leaders and others are aware that the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a front for the terrorist group Hamas, and has no place in any discussions or activities dealing with American school children.  See “CAIR is Hamas” document here.  DO teach children about America’s founding principles, specifically, “The law of nature and nature’s God” and what that legally means and how it relates to the foundation of U.S. law and government.
  9. BUSINESS LEADERS:  Identify key patriotic business leaders in the community, and educate them on the threat (once you understand it!).  Have team members ready to publicly call for boycotts and participate in public protests outside businesses who support jihadi organizations domestically or overseas.  Work to promote courageous men and women who understand the threat to be a part of your local chamber of commerce.
  10. LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS:  Mayors, city council members, and other local officials who are open-minded and able to hear and receive facts and truth should be engaged and taught about the threat of the Islamic Movement in the United States and your local area.  These officials should be be encouraged to know this threat and act accordingly in the day to day disposition of their duties as community leaders.  They should know they will be held accountable, and the team working with them should consistently be giving them positive or negative feedback based on their actions.

In all of this, local leaders should know your teams will stand with them through all of this if they do the right thing and speak truth.  There does not need to be a public proclamation by all these officials that they understand the threat.  Many will get much more done by quietly shutting the doors to the jihadis that have been open to them for so long.

The most important thing is the know the threat first before you ever decide to act.  When you act you must have a reasonable understanding of how the jihadis will respond so you will be prepared to counter-act them accordingly.

On 9/11/01, American citizens on United Airlines flight 93 took charge and won the day by ensuring a greater tragedy did not take place.  They gave their lives for all of us, as have thousands of American warriors on battlefields across the world.

Will you stand up and do your duty now?

Police Captains son sentenced for planned Jihadi attack at a University

Understanding the Threat, by Johhn Guandolo, September 6, 2018:

The son of a Boston police captain Alexander Ciccolo, who also went by the name Ali Al Amriki was sentenced yesterday to 20 years in prison.  Alexander Ciccolo father turned him to the FBI.  According to the Federal governments Affidavit and Memorandum, Alexander Ciccolo  was charged with possessing a firearm after previously being convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. ‘ 922(g)(1), which offense constitutes a felony that involves the possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. ‘ 3142(f)(1)(E). Alexander Ciccolo possessed four firearms which he ordered, including two rifles with large ammunition magazines, to use during his plan to kill in the name of Allah.

Before his arrest  told a friend that he believed the “faith is under attack” and that he is “not afraid to die for the cause.” Alexander Ciccolo Facebook profile, under the name “Ali Al Amriki,” contained information indicating he wanted to commit “martyrdom for the sake of Islam”.

On October 27, 2014, Ali Al Amriki’s  (Alexander Ciccolo) Facebook page posted an image that appeared to be a dead American soldier that included the following statement by Ali Al Amriki, “Thank you Islamic State! Now we won’t have to deal with these kafir back in America.” “Kafir” means “non-believers” of Islam. The information posted on the Facebook page also showed that Alexander Ciccolo wanted to fight for the Islamic State.

On June 24, 2015,  Alexander Ciccolo  met with a FBI informant and discussed plans to travel to another state to conduct terrorist attacks on civilians, members of the U.S. military and law enforcement personnel.  Ciccolo planned on attacking two different bars and a police station, and gave the locations. Ciccolo explained he planned to use improvised explosive devices during the attack to include pressure cooker bombs. During another conversation with the informant Ciccolo celebrated the June 26, 2015 Jihadi attack at a beachside resort in Tunisia in which one person used firearms and grenades to kill 38 people.  Alexander Ciccolo expressed  he needed four AK-47s, two sniper rifles, four handguns, and gelignite (a type of dynamite). Alexander Ciccolo also stated that he wanted to conduct an attack at a State University using assault rifles and explosives with the attack concentrated in the college dorms and cafeteria while broadcasting live on the internet.

Alexander Ciccolo told the informant he planned  to rob a gun store to obtain the weapons and travel out of state to purchase fireworks in order to obtain the black powder needed for the attacks and planned to purchase pressure cookers to use as improvised explosive devices.

On June 30, 2015 Alexander Ciccolo met with the FBI informant and explained that he had changed his plans from targeting a police station to targeting a university because there were many more people at the university and a “Very sinful and has a crowd.” Alexander Ciccolo said he wanted to protect Muslim students, saying they would  be permitted to help, sit tight or leave. Ciccolo said that he wanted to do it before Ramadan was over, and no later than July 31, 2015. Ciccolo told the FBI informant “We win or we die.”  A few days later after Alexander Ciccolo bought a pressure cooker he intended to use to build an explosive devise he sent a message, “Allahu Akbar!!!… I got the pressure cookers today. Alhamdulillah.”

On July 4, 2015 Alexander Ciccolo was arrested, waived his Miranda rights and spoke to FBI Special Agents.  He refused to talk about the guns with which he was arrested but he reaffirmed his support for the Islamic state. When arrested the first person he was able to attack was a nurse who he stabbed multiple times in the head with a pen.

On September 5, 2018 Alexander Ciccolo,  (Ali Al Amriki), was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Mark G. Mastroianni to 20 years in prison and a lifetime of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, one count of attempting to use weapons of mass destruction, one count of being a convicted person in possession of firearms, and one count of assaulting a nurse during a jail intake process by use of a deadly weapon causing bodily injury.

We shouldn’t be surprised. Alexander Ciccolo converted to Islam and is doing what the enemy doctrine mandates.  100% of Islamic sharia mandates warfare against non-muslims until the world is under Islamic rule (sharia). This is why he had a plan for the muslim students to be given a chance to fight or run to safety.  The fact of Alexander Ciccolo a police captains son  committing war against non-muslims  shouldn’t surprise anyone. In sharia (which all Muslims must follow) it comes from the Koran and the example of what Mohammad said and did (sunnah).

“Fight and slay the unbeliever wherever you find them, capture and besiege them,  and lie in wait for them in each and every ambush (strategem of war).” (Koran 9:5)

Mohammad said:  “I have been commanded to fight people until they testify there is no god but Allah and Mohammad is the Messenger of Allah.”  (Hadith reported by Bukhari and Muslim)

There is no such thing as a “different kind” of Sharia which does not mandate jihad until the world is under the rule of the sharia, and there is no other legal definition of “Jihad” in Sharia other than “warfare against non-Muslims.” Jihad is warfare against non-muslims.  A police Captain (who was one of the first to respond during the 2013 Boston bombing) has a son who tried to commit Jihad during Ramadan at a very public place to create mass casualties.  Let that sink in.

This is Islam. This is Sharia. Sharia kills. The war is here.

Brigitte Gabriel: ‘Something Has Happened in the Trump Presidency’ Regarding Radical Islam

BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images

Breitbart, by Dan Rhiehl, Sept. 12, 2017:

Brigitte Gabriel, president of Act for America and author of They Must Be Stopped: Why We Must Defeat Radical Islam and How We Can Do It, spoke with Breitbart News Daily SiriusXM host Raheem Kassam regarding her Breitbart News piece on 9/11 and President Trump’s failure to mention “radical Islamic terrorism” in his speech Monday.

Citing the speech, Gabriel said, “Yesterday, it was obvious that something has happened in the Trump presidency that has changed and changed dramatically. When I listened to the speeches yesterday – like you mentioned – by all the leaders in the administration – by Trump, by Mattis, by Pence – it was literally a speech that could have been uttered by President Obama himself.”

Gabriel went on to discuss the Saudis and their funding of mosques in America that she claims are linked to preaching hate.

LISTEN:

‘KNOWN WOLF’ TERROR SCANDAL: CIA Knew About 9-11 Hijackers, Didn’t Provide Intel to FBI

PJ Media, by Patrick Poole, Sept. 11, 2017:

As I’ve recounted in more than 30 articles here at PJ Media over the past three years, virtually every Islamic terrorist who has conducted an attack in the West since 9/11 has already been known to authorities, which prompted me to coin the phrase “known wolf” terrorism.

Amidst today’s commemoration of the 16th anniversary of 9/11, it bears recalling that 9/11 itself was a “known wolf” attack too.

The fact is that the CIA had intelligence that two Saudi 9/11 hijackers were living in the United States, but they deliberately refused to share the information with the FBI who had authority to act on such information and possibly prevent the 9/11 attacks.

In many respects, the 3,000 Americans killed on 9/11 were not only the victims of Al-Qaeda terrorists, but also bureaucratic incompetence and inter-governmental turf wars.

Who among those who sat on the information were punished? Well, none were. The CIA sitting on critical intelligence until just days before the attack was couched in the larger excuse of “intelligence failures” and swept under the rug.

Some of what we known about the CIA’s pre-9/11 intelligence about the hijackers comes from a joint congressional inquiry several years after the attacks, but the most revealing information has come from former FBI agent Mark Rossini, who though a FBI agent was assigned to the CIA and prevented from sharing the information with his colleagues.

Two years ago, Jeff Stein at Newsweek detailed Rossini’s story:

Rossini is well placed to do just that. He’s been at the center of one of the enduring mysteries of 9/11: Why the CIA refused to share information with the FBI (or any other agency) about the arrival of at least two well-known Al-Qaeda operatives in the United States in 2000, even though the spy agency had been tracking them closely for years.

That the CIA did block him and Doug Miller, a fellow FBI agent assigned to the “Alec Station,” the cover name for CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit, from notifying bureau headquarters about the terrorists has been told before, most notably in a 2009 Nova documentary on PBS, “The Spy Factory.” Rossini and Miller related how they learned earlier from the CIA that one of the terrorists (and future hijacker), Khalid al-Mihdhar, had multi-entry visas on a Saudi passport to enter the United States. When Miller drafted a report for FBI headquarters, a CIA manager in the top-secret unit told him to hold off. Incredulous, Miller and Rossini had to back down. The station’s rules prohibited them from talking to anyone outside their top-secret group.

The various commissions and internal agency reviews that examined the “intelligence failure” of 9/11 blamed institutional habits and personal rivalries among CIA, FBI and National Security Agency (NSA) officials for preventing them from sharing information. Out of those reviews came the creation of a new directorate of national intelligence, which stripped the CIA of its coordinating authority. But blaming “the system” sidesteps the issue of why one CIA officer in particular, Michael Anne Casey, ordered Rossini’s cohort, Miller, not to alert the FBI about al-Mihdhar. Or why the CIA’s Alec Station bosses failed to alert the FBI—or any other law enforcement agency—about the arrival of Nawaf al-Hazmi, another key Al-Qaeda operative (and future hijacker) the agency had been tracking to and from a terrorist summit in Malaysia.

Because Casey remains undercover at the CIA, Rossini does not name her in his unfinished manuscript. But he wrote, “When I confronted this person…she told me that ‘this was not a matter for the FBI. The next al-Qaeda attack is going to happen in Southeast Asia and their visas for America are just a diversion. You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’

Rossini recalled going to Miller’s cubicle right after his conversation with Casey. “He looked at me like I was speaking a foreign language.… We were both stunned and could not understand why the FBI was not going to be told about this.”

It remains a mystery. None of the post-9/11 investigating bodies were able to get to the bottom of it, in part because Rossini and Miller, who continued to work at Alec Station after the attacks, didn’t tell anyone what happened there. When congressional investigators came sniffing around, they kept their mouths shut.

“We were told not to say anything to them,” Rossini said. Who told you that? I asked. “The CIA. I can’t name names. It was just understood in the office that they were not to be trusted, that [the congressional investigators] were trying to pin this on someone, that they were trying to put someone in jail. They said [the investigators] weren’t authorized to know what was going on operationally.… When we were interviewed, the CIA had a person in the room, monitoring us.”

As a result, Rossini wasn’t interviewed by the subsequent 9/11 Commission, either. “Based on that interview, I guess the 9/11 Commission [which followed up the congressional probe] thought I didn’t have anything worthy to say.” He kept his secret, he said, from the Justice Department’s inspector general as well. “I was still in shock,” he added, and still fearful of violating Alec Station’s demand for omerta. Finally, when his own agency—the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)—came to him in late 2004, after the congressional probe and 9/11 Commission had issued their reports, he opened up.

The CIA has long insisted it shared intelligence about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with the FBI, but records gathered by the 9/11 Commission contradict this assertion. Indeed, the panel could find no records supporting the claim of another Alec Station supervisor, Alfreda Bikowsky, that she had hand-carried a report to the FBI.

“The FBI is telling the truth,” Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, told Newsweek. As for why the CIA not only failed to share pre-9/11 information on Al-Qaeda operatives but forbade the FBI agents in Alec Station from sharing it, Zelikow said, “We don’t know.”

Ironically, the intelligence that the CIA was holding onto was from a lead developed by the FBI investigating the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen.

The FBI had pinpointed an Al-Qaeda operative named Ahmed Al-Hada and from there mapped an extensive network, but the monitoring and intelligence gathering was the purview of the intelligence community, not the FBI.

Lawrence Wright of The New Yorker traced the intelligence the CIA developed on the 9/11 hijackers based on that FBI lead:

A conversation on the Hada phone at the end of 1999 mentioned a forthcoming meeting of Al Qaeda operatives in Malaysia. The C.I.A. learned the name of one participant, Khaled al-Mihdhar, and the first name of another: Nawaf. Both men were Saudi citizens. The C.I.A. did not pass this intelligence to the F.B.I.

However, the C.I.A. did share the information with Saudi authorities, who told the agency that Mihdhar and a man named Nawaf al-Hazmi were members of Al Qaeda. Based on this intelligence, the C.I.A. broke into a hotel room in Dubai where Mihdhar was staying, en route to Malaysia. The operatives photocopied Mihdhar’s passport and faxed it to Alec Station, the C.I.A. unit devoted to tracking bin Laden. Inside the passport was the critical information that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa. The agency did not alert the F.B.I. or the State Department so that Mihdhar’s name could be put on a terror watch list, which would have prevented him from entering the U.S.

The C.I.A. asked Malaysian authorities to provide surveillance of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which took place on January 5, 2000, at a condominium overlooking a golf course designed by Jack Nicklaus. The condo was owned by a Malaysian businessman who had ties to Al Qaeda. The pay phone that Soufan had queried the agency about was directly in front of the condo. Khallad used it to place calls to Quso in Yemen. Although the C.I.A. later denied that it knew anything about the phone, the number was recorded in the Malaysians’ surveillance log, which was given to the agency.

At the time of the Kuala Lumpur meeting, Special Branch, the Malaysian secret service, photographed about a dozen Al Qaeda associates outside the condo and visiting nearby Internet cafés. These pictures were turned over to the C.I.A. The meeting was not wiretapped; had it been, the agency might have uncovered the plots that culminated in the bombing of the Cole and the September 11, 2001, attacks. On January 8th, Special Branch notified the C.I.A. that three of the men who had been at the meeting—Mihdhar, Hazmi, and Khallad—were travelling together to Bangkok. There Khallad met with Quso and one of the suicide bombers of the Cole. Quso gave Khallad the thirty-six thousand dollars, which was most likely used to buy tickets to Los Angeles for Mihdhar and Hazmi and provide them with living expenses in the U.S. Both men ended up on planes involved in the September 11th attacks.

In March, the C.I.A. learned that Hazmi had flown to Los Angeles two months earlier, on January 15th. Had the agency checked the flight manifest, it would have noticed that Mihdhar was traveling with him. Once again, the agency neglected to inform the F.B.I. or the State Department that at least one Al Qaeda operative was in the country.

Although the C.I.A. was legally bound to share this kind of information with the bureau, it was protective of sensitive intelligence. The agency sometimes feared that F.B.I. prosecutions resulting from such intelligence might compromise its relationships with foreign services, although there were safeguards to protect confidential information. The C.I.A. was particularly wary of O’Neill, who demanded control of any case that touched on an F.B.I. investigation. Many C.I.A. officials disliked him and feared that he could not be trusted with sensitive intelligence. “O’Neill was duplicitous,” Michael Scheuer, the official who founded Alec Station but has now left the C.I.A., told me. “He had no concerns outside of making the bureau look good.” Several of O’Neill’s subordinates suggested that the C.I.A. hid the information out of personal animosity. “They hated John,” the F.B.I. counterterrorism official assigned to Alec Station told me. “They knew that John would have marched in there and taken control of that case.”

The C.I.A. may also have been protecting an overseas operation and was afraid that the F.B.I. would expose it. Moreover, Mihdhar and Hazmi could have seemed like attractive recruitment possibilities—the C.I.A. was desperate for a source inside Al Qaeda, having failed to penetrate the inner circle or even to place someone in the training camps, even though they were largely open to anyone who showed up. However, once Mihdhar and Hazmi entered the United States they were the province of the F.B.I. The C.I.A. has no legal authority to operate inside the country.

The CIA’s turf war with the FBI, in fact, would cost John O’Neill his life on 9/11. Having retired from the FBI in July 2001, he took up a new position as director of security for the World Trade Center. He died on the job during the attacks.

Other FBI agents working leads related to the 9/11 cell have also expressed frustration at the CIA’s reluctance to share the critical intelligence regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi with the FBI.

The terrorist pair had come under the watch of San Diego FBI agent Steven Butler when they lived there, but the information about their role in the Al-Qaeda network was never shared.

Two seasoned New York FBI terror investigators, Frank Pellegrino and John Anticev, also lament that the CIA’s intelligence could have helped prevent the 9/11 attacks.

The view raised by Wright in his New Yorker article that the CIA may have planned to, or possibly unsuccessfully tried to, recruit Mihdhar and Hazmi has the support of at least one senior official.

In a video interview for a documentary, Richard Clarke, who served as counter-terrorism ‘czar’ for President Bill Clinton and then President George W. Bush, speculates that this failed CIA recruitment scenario is exactly what happened (particularly ~4:00-8:00):

As Clarke, who was directly involved in a senior role in the events before and after 9/11, notes the CIA did finally turn over the information about the presence of Mihdhar and Hazmi in the U.S. three weeks before 9/11 on August 21st, but only after they had lost contact with the pair.

Clarke also notes that the information was only shared with lower level FBI officials and never with senior management.

But at a September 4th meeting on terrorism with Cabinet-level officials at the White House, the presence of two known Al-Qaeda operatives inside the United States was curiously never mentioned, let alone discussed.

One week later, 3,000 Americans would be dead, the World Trade Center would be destroyed, the Pentagon would be heavily damaged, and the U.S. economy would lose $1 trillion in value in just a few days.

As horrific as 9/11 was – the most lethal terrorist attack in modern world history – it is compounded by the tragedy that the reasons why that attack was allowed to happen have STILL never been fully investigated, let alone revealed.

And with each subsequent terror attack in the U.S., we discover that the suspects were again known to law enforcement and intelligence officials — “known wolf” attacks — with all indications that the negligence and mistakes made prior to 9/11 are still being made costing American lives.

That scandal demeans the lives of all those lost on that terrible day.

HOW CAN WE DEFEAT AN ENEMY WE CAN’T IDENTIFY?

aliven | Getty Images

Conservative Review, by Jordan Schachtel, Sept, 11, 2017:

Sixteen years after 9/11, Washington is still afraid to the name the enemy.

It continues to be painfully difficult for our leaders to utter the words “radical Islam” or any substitute meant to connote that there is a religious element to the global jihad being waged upon us. As with Voldemort in the Harry Potter series, presidents since 9/11 have chosen not to name the enemy, instead referring to our jihadi adversaries as “extremists” or “terrorists” and countless other boilerplate terms determined by our representatives in government as politically appropriate.

The whitewashing of the very Islamic nature of jihadi terror not only misleads the public, but makes it impossible for government and military officials to focus on what is motivating our enemies and how to stop them from continuing to threaten us. What is it that connects the ISIS leader in Raqqa to the hate-preaching U.S.-born Imam in California to the Uighur militants in western China? To our 21st century leadership, it’s not radical Islamic doctrine, but some kind of widespread mental disorder without a name.

From Presidents Bush 43 to Obama and now President Trump, the leader of the free world since 9/11 has pointedly refused to name the enemy that seeks our demise.

And although Osama bin Laden justified the killings of Americans in the name of Islam (through religious declarations known as fatwas), discussion about the radical Islamic component of 9/11 were immediately quashed. We were told there are no issues with Islam whatsoever, even as millions and millions took up arms against the West, citing Islam’s call for war against infidels.

Everyone had their excuses for failing to define the enemy.

To Presidents Bush and Obama, groups like al-Qaeda and other jihadist entities were merely a bunch of deranged, bloodthirsty maniacs who were not linked by any particular doctrine.

President Bush took pains to ignore the dangerous components of Islam and define it wholly as a “religion of peace.”

Just six days after the attacks, Bush remarked at the Islamic Center of Washington: “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war.”

Bush 43’s gross abdication of responsibility in defining our enemies continued into the Obama era.

President Obama became famously known for making sure to censor language that could possibly be interpreted as connecting our Islamic enemies (such as the terror state in Iran and the Islamic State terror group) to the Muslim faith.

“ISIL is not Islamic … ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple, and it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way, ” President Obama said in a 2014 speech.

To both Obama and Bush, jihadist groups killed for the sake of killing, and nothing more, at least according to their public messaging.

“There is no doubt, and I’ve said repeatedly, where we see terrorist organizations like al Qaeda or ISIL — They have perverted and distorted and tried to claim the mantle of Islam for an excuse for basically barbarism and death,” Obama said in a 2016 town hall.

And then came President Trump.

On the campaign trail, Trump ran as a candidate who had no issue with defining our enemy as “radical Islamic terrorists.” But since becoming president, he has fallen prey to the D.C. Swamp’s way of thinking on the issue.

Comparable to his predecessors, Trump has largely refrained from addressing the ideology that motivated the 9/11 hijackers. In his most recent speech on Afghanistan, Trump did not once discuss radical Islam, but only the “evil ideology” of our enemies. Like Bush and Obama, Trump has taken to understanding global jihadists as just a bunch of random lowlives.

“Terrorists who slaughter innocent people will find no glory in this life or the next. They are nothing but thugs and criminals and predators and — that’s right — losers,” Trump said in his Afghanistan speech.

We must never forget that the 9/11 hijackers were not poor, delusional individuals, as previous administrations tried to frame them. They were motivated by a specific doctrine. It wasn’t a coincidence that they used the Islamic war cry “Allahu Akbar” as they carried out by far the deadliest terror attack in American history.

But you can’t begin to defeat an enemy when you refuse to identify what it stands for. Even our Arab Muslim partners have come to determine and point out that there is a branch of Islamic doctrine that is growing at an exponential rate. Now is the time for our leaders to stand with them and take on this ideological enemy.

Sixteen years after 9/11, our leaders continue to pretend that there is no interconnectedness to the global threat of radical Islamic terror. If the politically correct policies of shielding Islam from the implications of terror continue, America’s long war will become its forever war.

Jordan Schachtel is the national security correspondent for Conservative Review. Follow him on Twitter @JordanSchachtel.